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ABSTRACT 
The utilisation of trusts has become a popular trend among taxpayers, especially high 
net worth individuals
1
 (hereafter HNWI) who wish to reduce potential estate duties. 
The SARS Strategic Plan stated that there is a ‘compliance risk posed by HNWI and 
the use of trusts to conceal their income’.2 The SARS Strategic Plan announced that 
trust reform would be prioritised. Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan (hereafter 
Gordhan) referred in his 2012/2013 budget speech
3
 to various measures proposed to 
protect the tax base and limit the scope for tax leakage and avoidance. Gordhan 
reiterated the state’s position regarding the abuse of trusts by indicating that reforms 
will be made regarding the taxation of both local and offshore trusts which have long 
been a problem for global tax enforcement due to their flexibility and flow-through 
nature.  
National Treasury and SARS are concerned about trusts, largely because of the 
income-splitting opportunities that trusts afford taxpayers. There are envisaged tax 
amendments which will impact South Africa’s (hereafter SA) trust landscape and 
could derail many carefully drafted trust structures.   
It will thus be important for estate owners to consider these envisaged tax 
amendments when they come into operation, in order to ascertain the full extent of the 
implications and then it can also further be determined what the impact of these 
                                                            
1 Income in excess of R7 million, alternatively R75 million in assets. South Afican Revenue Service 
(hereafter SARS) Strategic Plan (2012/13- 2016/17) 19 available at http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed 
6 November 2013) (hereafter SARS Strategic Plan).   
2 SARS Strategic Plan 19.  
3 2012-2013 budget speech  22 available at http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed 6 November 2013) 
(hereafter budget speech).   
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changes will be on the effectiveness of the discretionary family trust as an estate 
planning vehicle in SA in the future.  
The purpose of this thesis is to determine the impact of the current statutory anti-tax 
avoidance provisions on the effectiveness of the discretionary family trust as an estate 
planning vehicle in SA, especially due to the fact that the trust form has been abused 
in the past for tax avoidance purposes.  
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CHAPTER 1  
    INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION      
‘An estate plan is an arrangement for the use, conservation and transfer 
of one’s wealth. The process by which an estate plan is created is called 
estate planning. This process involves much more than merely preparing 
the estate owner’s last will and testament. A well thought out estate plan 
concerns itself with the creation of an estate where none would 
otherwise exist, the increase of an existing estate to meet the needs of the 
owner and its family and the preservation and protection of the estate 
from unnecessary taxes and costs.’4 
Estate owners
5
 who are ordinarily resident
6
 in SA are subject to estate duty on death 
levied at a rate of 20 per cent
7
 on the value of their property,
8
 subject to certain 
exemptions and exclusions.
9
 Estate planning in SA involves primarily structuring an 
estate owner’s affairs in such a manner as to minimise this estate duty liability, either 
                                                            
4Van der Westhuizen WM ‘The multidisciplinary nature of estate planning as a science’ (2002) JEPL 4 
5. 
5 The Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 (hereafter ITA) uses the term ‘natural person’ which is part of the 
definition of ‘resident’ in s 1 of the ITA.   
6 In Cohen v CIR 13 SATC 362 371, the court held that a person’s ordinary residence is his usual or 
principal residence and it would be described more aptly, in comparison to other countries as the 
person’s real home. See also CIR v Kuttel 54 SATC 298. H v COT 24 SATC 738.  
7 The First Schedule of the Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955 (hereafter EDA) states that the rate of estate 
duty shall be 20 per cent on the dutiable amount of the estate. See also Estate Duty available at 
http://www.sars.gov.za.(accessed 6 November 2013). This is the rate at the time of writing this thesis.      
8 Section 3 (2) of the EDA. The term ‘property’ will be dealt with in chapter 4 of this thesis.  
9 Section 3 (2) of the EDA.  
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upon his
10
 death or upon the death of his heirs inter alia by drafting an appropriate 
will and by setting up a local or offshore inter vivos
11
 or testamentary trust.
12
  
Estate planning in SA is not only done in order to avoid or minimise estate duty 
liability, but also to minimise or avoid the capital gains tax (hereafter CGT) which is 
imposed upon death.
13
     
Discretionary trusts are those under which the trustees have the discretion to distribute 
trust income and/or trust capital to the beneficiaries.
14
 It is primarily discretionary 
trusts, whether inter vivos or testamentary in nature, which are used in estate planning 
in SA. A discretionary inter vivos family trust is a popular vehicle for estate planning 
purposes because the trust assets are regarded as separate from those of the founder
15
 
as well as from those of an individual trust beneficiary.
16
 One reason for this is that a 
vested right
17
 to trust capital and/or trust income clearly falls within the definition of 
property for estate duty purposes. On the other hand, a contingent right to trust capital 
and/or trust income or a spes (as some courts have presented the position of a trust 
beneficiary under a discretionary trust prior to the exercise of the trustees’ 
                                                            
10 In this thesis, references to the masculine gender will include the feminine gender, unless the 
context indicates otherwise.  
11 Formed during the estate owner’s lifetime.   
12  Formed in terms of the last will of the estate owner. A discussion on testamentary trusts is not 
within the ambit of this thesis.   
13 Geach W & Yeats J Trusts: Law and Practice (2007) 280 (hereafter Geach (2007)).   
14 Under a vesting trust trustees have no discretion as to whether to distribute the trust income 
and/or trust capital to trust beneficiaries.  A discussion on the vesting trust is not within the ambit of 
this thesis.  
15 The person who forms the trust by making over or bequeathing property to trustees.  
16 A person who has certain rights in terms of a trust deed in respect of trust property. Exactly what 
those rights are must be ascertained from the reading of the trust deed. See Honiball M & Olivier L 
The taxation of trusts in South Africa (2009) 198 (hereafter Honiball & Olivier (2009)).  
17 In Jewish Colonial Trust Ltd v Estate Nathan 1940 AD 163 175 the court held that when it is said that 
a right is vested in a person, what is usually meant is that such person is the owner of that right- that 
he has all rights of enjoyment in such right, including the right of enjoyment.   
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discretion)
18
 falls outside a dutiable estate.
19
 In the case of Badenhorst v Badenhorst
20
 
(hereafter Badenhorst case) which dealt with an inter vivos discretionary family trust, 
the court indicated pertinently that the trust was created to protect the family against 
creditors and to avoid estate duty.
21
  
A family trust usually comes about where the trustees and the beneficiaries of a trust 
are the same persons, usually related to one another and to the founder.
22
 In the case 
of Van der Merwe NO and Another v Hydraberg Hydraulics CC and Another; Van 
der Merwe and Another v Bosman and Another
23
 (hereafter Van der Merwe case) the 
court held that family trusts are designed to secure the interests and protect the 
property of a group of family members, usually identified in the trust deed by name or 
by descent or by degree of kinship to the founder.
24
 In Nieuwoudt and Another NNO v 
Vrystaat Mielies (Edms) Bpk,
25
 Harms JA drew attention to this ‘newer type of family 
business trust’ where, for estate planning purposes or to escape the constraints 
imposed by corporate law, assets are put into a trust ‘while everything remains as 
before’. The court held in the Parker case that the primary responsibility for 
compliance with formalities and for ensuring that contracts lie within the authority 
conferred by the trust deed, lies with the trustees.
26
 Where they are also the 
beneficiaries of the trust, the debasement of the trust function that may result, means 
                                                            
18 Stern & Ruskin v Appleson 1951 3 SA 800 (W) 805D-E.  
19 Du Toit F South African Trust Law: Principles and Practice 2ed (2007) 159 (hereafter Du Toit F South 
African Trust Law (2007)).   
20 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA).  
21 Badenhorst case 363. This case will be discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis.  
22 Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v Parker and Others 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA) 87F- 88B 
(hereafter Parker case).  
23 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC) 568.  
24 Parker case 88.   
25 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) paragraph 24.  
26 Parker case 89.  
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all too often that the trustee duties are breached.  This situation may need legislative 
attention in the future.
27
   
There is nothing wrong in law or principle with a discretionary family trust if it is 
properly administered by independent trustees.
28
 The court held in the Van der Merwe 
case that the independent trustee’s position can never prevail against trustees, who if 
they vote together will always constitute a majority. In theory, the trust could operate 
with a real functional separation between control and benefit, if additional 
independent trustees were to be appointed, thereby overriding the otherwise 
controlling majority of the initially appointed beneficiary trustees or their 
successors.
29
  
In practice, this sort of trust is often the alter ego of the founder and/or trustee-
beneficiary of the trust. In the past a few family disputes went to court where the 
founder and/or trustee-beneficiary generally treated the trust assets as his own.
30
 The 
assets under the trust may, in law, be regarded as those of the founder and/or trustee-
beneficiary and dealt with accordingly.
31
 It also happens in practice that the trustees 
do not act jointly in terms of the trust deed. The case of Steyn and Another v 
Blockpave (Pty) Ltd
32
 (hereafter Steyn case) concerned a classic family feud. In this 
case a trustee was left out of the decision making of the trust. The trustee was not 
consulted about the issue that was decided upon at the meeting of the other two 
                                                            
27 Parker case 89. 
28 Parker case 90.  
29 Van der Merwe case 568.  
30 Geach (2007) 13.   
31 In the Badenhorst case the court took into consideration the assets of the trust of the dominant 
trustee (husband) when the redistribution order was made in terms of s 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 
1979  (hereafter DA).    
32 2011 (3) SA 528 (FB).  
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trustees.
33
 The court held that the trust required the full and complete participation of 
all its trustees in order to function legally. The trustees have to decide, participate and 
act together as one, in dealing with the affairs of the trust, even when they are not all 
agreed, or even where they are not all present at the same time. Internal dissent among 
the trustees on a particular point has to be buried, once the majority vote has been 
taken. Externally, all the trustees have to present a united front, in spite of earlier 
dissension.
34
 The court also held that the only permissible way in which a trust 
communicates with the world is through its resolutions and there was no proper 
resolution taken by the entire complement of the trust body in this case.
35
 The Steyn 
case also highlights the fact that the specified minimum number of trustees must hold 
office and make decisions on behalf of the trust. The fact that a trustee resigned 
functionally paralysed the trust. The court also held in the Van der Merwe case that 
trustees must act jointly in the discharge of their functions; moreover, that this is not a 
matter of ‘internal management’, but a matter of capacity.36         
In order to avoid trust assets being regarded as the assets of someone rather than those 
of the trust, it is advisable to ensure that there is indeed a making over of trust assets 
to trustees, and that the trustees actually do manage and control assets on behalf of the 
trust beneficiaries in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust deed. Due 
to the abuse of the trust form by founders, beneficiaries and/or trustees, trusts are 
increasingly coming under scrutiny by the courts.  
There are also certain limits to estate planning which taxpayers cannot exceed. Tax 
avoidance refers to a situation where a taxpayer, within the provisions of legislation, 
                                                            
33 Steyn case 531.  
34 Steyn case 532.  
35 Steyn case 534.  
36 Van der Merwe case 567.  
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arranges his tax affairs so that his tax liability is minimised or completely avoided.
37
 It 
is on this basis that it is necessary to determine what the impact is of statutory anti-tax 
avoidance measures on the discretionary family trust as an estate planning vehicle in 
SA.    
1.2 PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of the research is to determine the impact that statutory anti-tax 
avoidance measures have on the effectiveness of the discretionary family trust as an 
estate planning vehicle in SA. This question is posed due to the fact that the SA 
legislature introduced a number of legislative amendments ostensibly aimed at 
making trusts an unattractive tool for tax avoidance. For purposes of this thesis the 
focus will be mainly on the statutory anti-tax avoidance measures relating to trusts in 
which ownership of the trust assets have been transferred to the trustees. The research 
will be based on a study of case law, scholarly articles and legislation. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION  
The SA legislature has introduced amendments to make the trust an unattractive tool 
for tax avoidance. In light of the many legislative developments regarding particularly 
the taxation of trusts, the specific research question to be answered in this thesis is: 
what is the impact of the statutory anti-tax avoidance measures on the effectiveness of 
the discretionary family trust as an estate planning vehicle in SA?  
 
 
                                                            
37 Tsatsawane K  ‘Tax avoidance’(2001) JBL 8 (hereafter Tsatsawane K (2001) JBL).    
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1.4  RESEARCH OUTLINE   
When devising any estate plan, the various statutory anti-tax avoidance provisions 
must be taken into account. While there are currently no general anti-tax avoidance 
provisions applicable to the avoidance of estate duty, there are other anti-tax 
avoidance measures which could potentially apply, like s 7 of the ITA in relation to 
income and paragraphs 68 to 72 in the Eighth Schedule of the ITA in relation to 
capital gain. These provisions will be discussed in this thesis.   
Chapter one is the introduction to this study. 
Chapter two of the thesis serves as background to the study where consideration will 
be given  to the definition of a trust. The fiduciary nature of the trustee office as well 
as the position of the contingent trust beneficiary will be discussed briefly. The 
relevant duties which the provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988  
(hereafter TPCA) imposes on trustees in relation to the administration of the trust  
property will also be overviewed.  
 
Chapter three will consist of the ‘substance over form’ doctrine (hereafter the  
doctrine). The focus will be mainly on how our courts have changed their view over 
the years with regards to the application of the doctrine. It will further be determined 
in this chapter when courts are prepared to ‘pierce the veneer of the trust’. 
Chapter four will consist of the statutory anti-tax avoidance measures which relate to 
 the taxation of a trust, in particular income and capital gain. The effect of s 3(3)(d) of 
 the EDA on the discretionary family trust will also be discussed.  
 19 
Chapter five is the concluding chapter of this study. The impact of the statutory anti- 
avoidance measures on the discretionary family trust will be stated, taking into 
account all the information that was analysed in this study. 
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     CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND TO STUDY  
‘The essential notion of trust law, from which the further development of 
the trust form must proceed, is that enjoyment and control should be 
functionally separate. The duties imposed on trustees, and the standard 
of care exacted of them, derive from this principle. And it is the 
separation that serves to secure diligence on the part of the trustee, 
since a lapse may be visited with action by beneficiaries whose interests 
conduce to demanding better. The same separation tends to ensure 
independence of judgement on the part of the trustee- an indispensable 
requisite of office-as well as careful scrutiny of transactions designed to 
bind the trust, and compliance with formalities (whether relating to 
authority or internal procedures), since an independent trustee can have 
no interest in concluding transactions that may prove invalid.’38     
 
1.INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the statutory definitions of trusts in terms of the TPCA and 
the ITA. These definitions are central to this study due to the fact that the impact of 
the statutory anti-tax avoidance measures on the effectiveness of the discretionary 
family trust for estate planning will be determined.
39
 The Parker case is important for 
estate planning and a discussion will later follow with regards to the above-stated 
                                                            
38 Parker case 87.   
39 ‘Trust’ is not defined in the EDA.  
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separation of control and enjoyment.
40
 The fiduciary nature of the office of the trustee 
will be introduced in this chapter. The duties that are imposed on trustees relating to 
trust management will also be introduced in this chapter.   
 
2. THE TRUST: STATUTORY DEFINITIONS    
Trusts are governed largely by common law. In 1988 the legislature introduced the 
TPCA to regulate certain aspects of SA trust law. The TPCA is by no means an 
attempt to codify the SA law of trusts. The TPCA is devoted to establishing a firmer 
control over trustees and their stewardship of the trust by the Master of the High 
Court.  
The TPCA contains a statutory definition of ‘trust’. The definition conforms to the 
definition in the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and their 
Recognition of 10 January 1986
41
 (hereafter Hague Convention).Under the Hague 
Convention, a trust is defined in article 2 as:  
‘the legal relationship created inter vivos or on death by a person  
(the settlor), when assets have been placed under the control of a trustee  
for the benefit of a beneficiary or for a specified purpose.’  
Under the TPCA a trust is defined in s 1 as:  
                                                            
40 See chapter 3 of this thesis.  
41 Hague Convention on the law applicable to trusts and their recognition of 10 January 1986  
available at http://www hcch.net (Convention of 1 July 1985 on the law applicable to trusts and on 
their recognition) (accessed 9 August 2012).   
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‘the arrangement through which the ownership in property of one person is 
by virtue of
  
a trust instrument made over or bequeathed-  
(a) to another person, the trustee, in whole or in part, to be administered 
or disposed of according to the provisions of the trust instrument for 
the benefit of the person or class of persons designated in the trust 
instrument or for the achievement of the object stated in the trust 
instrument; or  
(b) to the beneficiaries designated in the trust instrument, which 
property is placed under the control of another person, the trustee, to 
be administered or disposed of according to the provisions of the 
trust instrument for the benefit of the person or class of persons 
designated in the trust instrument or for the achievement of the 
object stated in the trust instrument. 
but does not include the case where the property of another is to be 
administered by any person as executor, tutor or curator in terms of the 
provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, 1965.’42 
The above definition provides for two categories of trusts. The first is the so-called 
ownership trust (described in paragraph (a) of the definition) where the trustee is 
vested with ownership of the trust property. The trustee must, however, exercise the 
powers of control and disposal inherent in such ownership for the benefit of the trust 
                                                            
4266 of 1965. 
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beneficiaries or in order to achieve the objectives of the trust as stated in the trust 
instrument.
43
 
The second category is the so-called bewind trust (described in paragraph (b) of the 
definition)
44
 where the trust beneficiaries are vested with ownership of the trust 
property, while the powers of control and disposal over the property are vested in the 
trustee. These powers of control and disposal must be exercised for the benefit of the 
trust beneficiaries or in order to achieve the objectives of the trust as stated in the trust 
instrument.  
Section 1 of the ITA defines ‘trust’ as:  
‘Any trust fund consisting of cash or other assets which are 
administered and controlled by a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
where such person is appointed under a deed of trust or by agreement or 
under the will of a deceased person.’ 
The definition of ‘trust’ in s 1 of the TPCA gives legislative expression to what 
Cameron JA in the Parker case called the ‘core idea’ of the trust, namely the 
functional separation of the trustee’s ownership (or control) over trust property from 
the enjoyment derived from such ownership (or control) through the bestowal of trust 
benefits on the trust’s beneficiaries or through the achievement of the trust’s object, as 
stated above.
45
    
                                                            
43Estate Kemp v Mc Donald’s Trustee 1915 AD 498.  
44 Olivier L ‘Trusts: Traps and pitfalls’ (2001) SALJ 224 226 (hereafter Oliver L ‘Trusts: Traps and pitfalls’ 
(2001)).  
45 Parker case 86.  
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When comparing the definition of ‘trust’ in the TPCA and ITA it is clear that the 
objective of the trust is of utmost importance. The objectives of the trust can only be 
achieved if the provisions of the trust instrument, trust deed or will are adhered to. 
This submission accords with the Parker case where the court held that the trust deed 
is a trust’s constitutive charter. The trustees can only act in terms of the provisions of 
the trust deed. Moreover, the trust estate cannot be bound if the trustees act outside of 
the provisions of the trust deed.
46
    
 
3. THE FIDUCIARY NATURE OF TRUSTEESHIP AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONTINGENT TRUST BENEFICIARIES 
One of the principal characteristics of the office of the trustee is that it is fiduciary in 
nature.
47
 Stated differently, a trustee occupies a fiduciary position
48
 or holds trust 
property in a fiduciary capacity.
49
 Whatever description is used, the essential notion is 
that a trustee owes a fiduciary duty to trust beneficiaries.
50
  
In the Doyle case the court held with regard to an inter vivos trust:  
‘[W]hile the [trust] contract is alive, it appears to me to be 
unquestionable that a trustee occupies a fiduciary office. By virtue of 
that alone he owes the utmost good faith to all beneficiaries, whether 
actual or potential. Obligations towards contingent beneficiaries may 
                                                            
46 Parker case 84.  
47 Doyle v Board of Executors 1999 (2) SA 805 (C) 813 A-B (hereafter Doyle case).   
48 Doyle case 812J. 
49 Doyle case 808D. 
50 Du Toit F ‘The fiduciary office of trustee and the protection of contingent trust beneficiaries’ 2007 
Stell LR 469 471 (hereafter Du Toit F (2007) Stell LR).  
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well end because the contract is lawfully revoked. It does not follow that 
the trustee never held those duties during the subsistence of his office.’51 
Two considerations in particular are important in establishing the existence, nature 
and extent of a trustee’s fiduciary duty. First, the main focus of a trustee’s fiduciary 
duty is the manner in which he administrates the trust property. Secondly, the trustee 
should administer the trust property to the advantage of the trust beneficiaries since 
they are beneficially interested in such proper administration.
52
 It is settled law that a 
trustee must, as a bonus et diligens paterfamilias, conduct trust administration with 
the utmost good faith and in the best interests of the trust beneficiaries.
53
  
A trust beneficiary who, in terms of the trust instrument, enjoys an immediate right to 
trust benefits (whether income and/or capital), is vested with a personal right to claim 
payment of such benefits from the trust’s trustee when it becomes distributable.54 If a 
trust instrument provides that a trust beneficiary’s acquisition of a personal right to 
claim payment of trust benefits is contingent upon the occurrence of an uncertain 
future event, a personal right to claim trust benefits will only vest in such beneficiary 
if and when the contingency has taken place.
55
 Before the occurrence of the 
contingency, the beneficiary is said to enjoy a so-called ‘contingent right’ to trust 
benefits and such a beneficiary is often called a ‘contingent beneficiary’ or ‘potential 
beneficiary’.56 
                                                            
51Doyle case 812I- 813B. 
52Jowell v Bramwell- Jones 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) 891B -894E. 
53Doyle case 813B. 
54Tjimstra NO v Blunt-Mackenzie & Others 2002 (1) SA 459 (T) 468. 
55Webb v Davis 1998 (2) SA 975 (SCA) 981I-J. 
56Doyle case 813B. 
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In Potgieter and Another v Potgieter NO and Another
57
 (hereafter Potgieter case) a 
trust deed was varied by way of a formal agreement between the founder and the 
trustees. The changes brought about to the original trust deed were substantial, 
including a change to the trust’s name and a change whereby the appellants who had 
been capital beneficiaries were no longer the only capital beneficiaries but were 
reduced to members of a class of potential beneficiaries. The court held that the fact 
that the appellants enjoyed no vested rights to either income or capital, did not mean 
that their consent was not required when a decision to vary the trust deed was taken.  
As Brand JA said:  
‘They were clearly contingent beneficiaries only, but that does not render  
their acceptance of these contingent benefits irrelevant.’58 
Every trust beneficiary enjoys a personal right against the trustee for the proper 
administration of the trust in accordance with the demands of his fiduciary office 
because, according to Gross v Pentz
59
 (hereafter Gross case), every trust beneficiary 
holds an interest in a trustee’s proper trust administration.60 In the Potgieter case the 
court held that our law affords also the contingent beneficiary the right to protect his 
or her interest against maladministration by the trustee.
61
 
The fact that the contingent beneficiary is also entitled to the proper administration of 
the trust property enhance the trust as an estate planning vehicle due to the fact that 
                                                            
57 2012 (1) SA 637 (SCA).  
58 Potgieter case paragraph 28.  
59 1996 (4) SA 617 A.  
60 Gross case 628 I-J.  
61 Potgieter case 649.  
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the trustee should take special precaution when dealing with the trust property due to 
the fiduciary duty that he has to all the beneficiaries of the trust.   
  
4. SOME DUTIES IMPOSED ON TRUSTEES RELATING TO TRUST 
MANAGEMENT   
The legislature has introduced several provisions in the TPCA in order to ensure 
proper and prudent trustee conduct in trust management. Examples of provisions of 
the TPCA with this aim are:  
 Section 10 of the TPCA provides that whenever a person receives money in 
his capacity as trustee, he should deposit the money in a separate trust account 
at a banking institution or building society. The trustee is thus not allowed to 
deposit the money into his personal bank account.  
 Section 11 of the TPCA provides for the registration and identification of trust 
property. The trustee must clearly indicate in his bookkeeping the property 
which he holds in his capacity as trustee. The trustee must also make any 
account or investment at a financial institution identifiable as a trust account or 
trust investment.  
 Section 12 of the TPCA provides that the trust property shall not form part of 
the personal estate of the trustee except in so far as the trust beneficiary is 
entitled to the trust property.  
 Section 17 of the TPCA provides that a trustee shall not without the written 
consent of the Master destroy any document which serves as proof of the 
 28 
investment, safe custody, control, administration, alienation or distribution of 
trust property before the expiry of a period of five years from the termination 
of the trust. 
These provisions enhance the trust as estate planning vehicle because they serve to 
establish a permanent constructive record of trustee actions regarding trust 
management. These provisions are particularly important due to the fact that cases 
will be discussed later in this thesis where the trustees treated the trust property as 
their personal property.   
 
5. SUMMARY  
The definitions of a ‘trust’ in terms of the ITA and the TPCA were introduced in this 
chapter. These definitions give legislative expression to the principal idea of a trust, 
namely the separation of control (ownership) from the enjoyment derived from the 
benefits of the trust property by the trust beneficiaries. It was highlighted that the 
trustee owes a fiduciary duty to the trust beneficiaries, and this duty extends also to 
contingent trust beneficiaries. The relevant provisions of the TPCA which impose on 
a trustee certain duties which he must implement in the administration of the trust 
estate were discussed. These provisions are indicative of the legislative control over 
trustees and aim to ensure proper trustee conduct in the administration of the trust.  
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  CHAPTER 3 
THE ‘SUBSTANCE OVER FORM’ DOCTRINE (HEREAFTER THE 
DOCTRINE) AND ABUSE OF THE TRUST FORM 
1. INTRODUCTION   
‘Within the bounds of any anti-avoidance provisions in the relevant 
legislation, a taxpayer may minimise his tax liability by arranging his 
affairs in a suitable manner. If, for example, the same commercial result 
can be achieved in different ways, he may enter into the type of 
transaction which does not attract tax or attracts less tax. But, when it 
comes to considering whether by doing so he has succeeded in avoiding 
or reducing tax, the Court will give effect to the true nature and 
substance of the transaction and will not be deceived by its form.’62  
The doctrine will be discussed in this chapter. Cases will be discussed in which courts 
applied the doctrine in order to determine whether transactions were entered into for 
tax avoidance purposes. Cases will be discussed in which courts had to decide 
whether the parties to an agreement had the intention to enter into that agreement in 
the form alleged by them or whether they used the agreement as a disguise for 
something else. The purpose of this discussion is to point out the general simulation 
issue and how the principles pertaining to tax avoidance can be used to determine the 
possible invalidity of a transaction of a trust. Cases will be discussed where the courts 
did not declare the trusts as invalid or shams but explored the possibility to ‘pierce the 
veneer of the trust’. This is important for estate planning purposes because if the 
                                                            
62 Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) Ltd and Another v CIR 1996 (3) SA 942 (A) 950I-952C (hereafter Erf 
3183/1 Ladysmith case).   
 30 
veneer of the trust is pierced, the trust property may be regarded as the personal 
property of the estate owner. This will have the effect that the estate owner’s estate 
may be liable for estate duty.     
 
2. THE DOCTRINE 
Tax avoidance refers to a situation in which a taxpayer, within the provisions of the 
tax statute, arranges his affairs so that his tax obligation is minimized or completely 
avoided.
63
 Although a taxpayer may manage his affairs to the best of his advantage, 
his management will not withstand the scrutiny of the courts if it relies on simulated 
schemes or transactions in which the real underlying intention of the parties differs 
from their apparent intention.
64
 In the Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith case the taxpayer sought 
to rely upon the following rule in Inland Revenue Commissioner (hereafter IRC) v 
The Duke of Westminister
65
 (hereafter Duke of Westminster case). 
‘Every man is entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax 
attaching under the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise 
would be.’66 
The issue in the Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith case was whether the taxpayer, a property 
owning company, was liable to pay tax because an accrual of income had occurred 
within the meaning of paragraph (h) of the definition of ‘gross-income’ in s 1 of the 
ITA. Deciding that such an accrual had taken place, the Commissioner of SARS 
                                                            
63 Tsatsawane K (2001) 8.   
64 Chadwick I ‘How far can the taxpayer go in ‘ordering his affairs’? (1998) 6 JBL. 
65 [1936] AC 1 (HL).   
66 Duke of Westminster case 19.  
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(hereafter Commissioner) taxed the appellant accordingly. The court had to determine 
the applicability of the two principles on which both the taxpayer and the 
Commissioner relied. As stated above, the taxpayer relied on the principle that a 
taxpayer is entitled to arrange his affairs so as to remain outside provisions of a 
particular statute. The Commissioner relied on the principle that the courts should not 
be deceived by the form of a transaction but should examine its substance. The 
approach of our courts have always been, as it was held in the case of Dadoo Ltd and 
Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council
67
 (hereafter Dadoo case) that the real 
intention carries more weight than a fraudulent pretence.
68
  The court in the Erf 
3183/1 Ladysmith case held that parties may well arrange their affairs so as to avoid a 
particular statute, but the court will not be deceived by the form of a transaction. It 
will examine the true nature and substance of the transaction.
69
     
Many South African cases developed the doctrine over more than a century. In 
Zandberg v Van Zyl
70
 the court laid the basis of the doctrine:  
‘Not frequently, however (either to secure some advantage which 
otherwise the law would not give, or to escape some disability which the 
law would impose), the parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal its 
real character. They call it by a name, or give it a shape, intended not to 
express but to disguise its true nature. And when a court is asked to 
                                                            
67 1920 AD 530.   
68 Dadoo case 547. 
69 Erf 3182/1 Ladysmith case 952.  
70 1910 AD 302.  
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decide any rights under such an agreement, it can only do so by giving 
effect to what the transaction really is, not what it purports to be.’71 
 A fundamental shift from this position emanates from the judgement in the case of 
Commissioner v NWK Ltd
72
 (hereafter NWK case). The NWK case expands the 
traditional understanding and application of the doctrine. It focuses on a substance 
and form different from those in the older cases relating to the doctrine. It also has 
considerable implications for tax structures and the Commissioner’s course of action 
against taxpayers who seek to evade tax.
73
  
The salient facts in the NWK case were that over a period of 5 years,  the respondent, 
NWK Ltd, claimed deductions from income tax in respect of interest paid on a loan to 
it by Slabs Trading Company (Pty) Ltd (hereafter Slab), a subsidiary of First National 
Bank (hereafter FNB), in the sum of R96 415 776.
74
 In 2003 however, the appellant, 
the Commissioner, issued new assessments and disallowed the deductions.
75
 The basis 
for the revised assessments by the Commissioner was that the loan was not a genuine 
contract. It was part of a series of transactions entered into between NWK, FNB and 
its subsidiaries. The court held that the series of transactions were all designed to 
disguise the true nature of the transaction between NWK and FNB. The court held this 
due to the fact that during 1998, FNB offered a ‘structure finance facility’ of R50 
million to NWK, repayable in 5 equal annual capital and interest payments over 5 
years ending on 28 February 2003.
76
 NWK accepted the offer on the terms proposed 
                                                            
71 Zandberg v Van Zyl 1910 AD 302 309.  
72 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA).  
73 Legwaila T ‘Modernising the ‘substance over form’ doctrine: CSARS v NWK Ltd (2012) SA Merc LJ 
116 121 (hereafter Legwaila T (2012)).   
74 NWK case 68.  
75 NWK case 68. 
76 NWK case 69. 
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by FNB because it wished to take advantage of the tax benefits. The court held that 
the intention to perform in accordance with the terms of the contract is questionable. 
The court further held that there must be some substance and commercial reason in 
the contract, not just an intention to achieve a tax benefit.
77
 The court further held that 
the loan for R96 415 776 was a transaction designed to disguise the real agreement 
between the parties, which was a loan of R50 million.
78
 
The ratio decidendi in the NWK case is found in the following extract:  
‘In my view the test to determine simulation cannot simply be whether 
there is an intention to give effect to a contract in accordance with its 
terms. Invariably, where parties structure a transaction to achieve an 
objective other than the one ostensibly achieved they will intend to give 
effect to the transaction on the terms agreed. The test should thus go 
further, and require an examination of the commercial sense of the 
transaction: of its real substance and purpose. If the purpose of the 
transaction is only to achieve an object that allows the evasion of tax, or 
of a peremptory law, then it will be regarded as simulated. And the mere 
fact that parties do perform in terms of the contract does not show that it 
is not simulated: the charade of performance is generally meant to give 
credence to their simulation.’79 
The crux of the NWK judgment is that a transaction will be regarded as simulated if 
lacking in commercial sense. The mere fact that a transaction was implemented in 
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accordance with its terms would not preclude a finding that it was simulated.
80
 It will 
be found to be simulated if there was no real commercial reason for it other than the 
additional tax benefit obtained.   
In Bosch and Another v Commissioner
81
 (hereafter Bosch case), the court had an 
opportunity to consider the judgment of the NWK case. 
The court held: 
‘…there is nothing in the careful judgement of Lewis JA which supports 
the argument that the reasoning as employed in NWK was intended to 
alter the settled principles developed over more than a century 
regarding the determination of a simulated transaction for the purposes 
of tax.’82 
The court held that without an express declaration to that effect, NWK should be 
interpreted to fit within a century of established principle. The minority judgment in 
the Bosch case delivered by Waglay J however stated that the NWK case is a dramatic 
reversal of what has been a consistent view of what constitutes a simulated 
transaction. NWK, considered in its entirety, does in fact lay down the rule that any 
transaction which has its aim of tax avoidance will be regarded as a simulated 
transaction irrespective of the fact that the transaction is for all purposes a genuine 
transaction.
83
 Before one is bound to a precedent setting judgment and is obliged to 
follow it, the judgment must be clear and unequivocal, it must be plain, unmistakable 
and explicit in its rejection of previous judgments which it seeks to reverse, and it 
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must be applicable to the facts in the matter before the court confronted with its 
possible application. Waglay J further stated that while he does not believe that the 
reversal must be express, the reasoning should demonstrate a departure from previous 
binding judgments. The NWK case does not in his view do so. It does not provide any 
reasons why the settled law should not be followed.
84
 Waglay J is thus of the opinion 
that the NWK case cannot be read to serve as a precedent in a case where evasion is 
not the issue. In any event, any transaction which has its purpose as tax evasion is 
unlawful. The NWK case cannot therefore be authority for setting aside a transaction 
as simulated by reason of being a vehicle of tax evasion as this is automatic in terms 
of the law.
85
 Waglay J further on the other hand held that if the words ‘evasion of tax’ 
are substituted with ‘avoidance of tax’, then the dictum goes against the accepted 
practice in our law which permits transactions aimed at tax avoidance. Furthermore, 
the confusion created by the judgment militates against it serving as a precedent 
binding upon the lower courts.
86
     
Moosa submits that the court failed in the NWK case to indicate whether, in relation to 
the objective of securing a tax advantage, the business reason must be a dominant 
purpose. It also provided no basis by which the business sense of a contract is to be 
tested.
87
 Moosa further submits that this is to be determined on a case by case basis 
and that, in this context, a transaction will pass the muster of the test if it is 
commercially expedient or facilitates the carrying on of the taxpayer’s trade.88  
                                                            
84 Bosch case 159.  
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The fundamental change brought about by the NWK case pertains to the extent to 
which the court recalibrated the test for simulation.
89
 The NWK case has the potential 
to change the landscape of our jurisprudence in so far as concerns a taxpayer’s right to 
plan his financial affairs in a manner which will yield the most beneficial tax 
advantage. The judgment reflects a marked shift towards a stricter approach to the 
evaluation of contracts designed to create a tax benefit. Its effect is so pervasive that it 
extends to all transactions concluded in the ordinary course of carrying on a trade, 
including contracts of employment.
90
     
SARS welcomed the decision of the court in the NWK case.
91
 The media release after 
the judgment stated that SARS is of the view that a simulated transaction generally 
involves an element of misrepresentation or non-disclosure. The media release further 
stated that SARS is aware that a number of other taxpayers have entered into 
simulated transactions, including compulsory convertible loans similar to the one at 
issue in the NWK case, with the effect of artificially reducing their tax liabilities. In 
the media release SARS stated that they would commence with audits of these 
taxpayers and that additional tax and interest were likely to be levied in issuing 
assessments in respect of the simulated transactions.  
It is evident that the doctrine of stare decisis will enable SARS to use the principles 
crystallised in the NWK case as a weapon in its arsenal to combat the tax 
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http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed 17 November 2013).  
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consequences flowing from a contract which it perceives not to be in the best interest 
of the fiscus.
92
     
For estate planning purposes, should estate owners and/or trustees of discretionary 
family trusts be cognisant of the fact that if the court determines that the reason why a 
transaction was entered into was for the purpose to avoid liability for tax, the court 
may regard the transaction as simulated. Tax liability may then possibly follow. The 
principle of the NWK case can, for example, be applied in a situation where shares are 
sold to a discretionary family trust at their market value but the selling price is left 
outstanding on loan account. The estate owner and/or donor may further also be held 
liable in terms of the general anti-avoidance provisions, which are contained in s 80A 
to s 80L of the ITA. This transaction would not pass the commercial rationality test as 
it was set out in the NWK case.  
The NWK case provides SARS with so wide a power to attack transactions that seek 
to save, reduce or defer tax.
93
 It must be borne in mind that transactions that trustees 
of a discretionary family trust enter into may especially be scrutinised by our courts 
due to the fact that the trustees are simultaneously the principal beneficiaries and have 
an interest in obtaining loans.
94
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3.‘PIERCING THE VENEER OF THE TRUST’ 
In order to understand the applicability of the doctrine to trusts, it is necessary to look 
at the basic requirements for a valid trust.
95
  
The requirements for a valid trust are:
96
 
 The founder must intend to create a trust. 
 The founder’s intention must be expressed in a mode appropriate to create an 
obligation (such as a valid contract or will).  
 The trust property must be defined with reasonable certainty. 
 The trust object must be defined with reasonable certainty. 
 The trust object must be lawful.  
If one or more of these requirements are not met, then no trust is established. For a 
founder to have the intention to create a trust, he needs to have the intention to hand 
over to another the control of the property to be administered for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries.
97
 In the following cases, however, the courts did not state that the trusts 
were shams or invalid. The trustees however abused the trust form. The courts, 
therefore, mentioned the possibility to ‘pierce the veneer of the trusts’. In the situation 
where the trust form has been abused, there is still a valid trust but there is a 
justification for the courts to go behind the trust form.
98
 There are practical 
implications when it is discovered that a trust is a sham, on the one hand, and when 
                                                            
95 Olivier L & Honiball M International Tax A South African Perspective 4ed (2008) 269 (hereafter 
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the trust form has been abused, on the other hand. When a trust is a sham, the 
‘founder’ will remain owner of the ‘trust assets’. Consequently, neither the ‘trustees’ 
nor the ‘beneficiaries’ will acquire any rights with regard to these ‘trust assets’.99 
Matters are different in the abuse situation since both the trustees and beneficiaries 
will acquire rights with regard to the trust assets. This opens the door for the 
possibility that the court may go behind the trust form and order the application of the 
trust assets for a particular purpose.
100
 
The following cases, amongst others, dealt with situations where the courts explored 
the possibility to ‘pierce the veneer of the trust’ and also illustrate situations where the 
trust form was abused. In Jordaan v Jordaan
101
 (hereafter Jordaan case) the court had 
to decide whether the assets of the trusts of the divorced husband should be included 
in the distribution order. The court held that the defendant had in the past used the 
trusts for financial gain in his personal capacity. The court further held that the 
manner in which the trusts had been administered in the past was an important factor. 
It appeared from the financial statements and the evidence that a substantial amount 
of money flowed between the various trusts, without any formal decisions being taken 
by the trustees. The defendant had regarded the trusts as a vehicle whereby he could 
gain a financial benefit for himself.
102
 The court held that the assets of the trusts could 
be taken into account in the determination of the redistribution order in terms of s 7(3) 
of the DA.
103
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In the Badenhorst case the issue was whether when making a redistribution order in 
terms of s 7(3) of the DA, the assets of an inter vivos discretionary trust which was 
created during the marriage of the parties must be taken into account.
104
 The court 
held that it was necessary to show that the party in question controlled the trust and 
that, but for the trust, he would have acquired and owned the assets in his own 
name.
105
 The control had to be de facto and to determine whether a party had such 
control it was necessary to first analyse the terms of the trust deed and to consider 
how the affairs of the trust were conducted during the marriage.
106
 
The court considered the facts that the respondent seldom sought the approval of his 
co-trustees when making important decisions regarding the trust. He used the trust as 
a vehicle for his own business activities. He paid little regard to the difference 
between trust assets and his own assets. He could change the terms of the trust deed 
and could also discharge and appoint co-trustees on his own. The court also took into 
account the fact that he had the discretion to determine when trust income or trust 
capital could vest in a beneficiary.
107
 Taking all these facts into account it was evident 
that the respondent was in full de facto control of the trust.
108
 The court accordingly 
held, that the trust assets should have been added to the value of the respondent’s 
estate.
109
 It must be noted that the court did not expressly state that the trust was a 
sham because the relevant provision, s 7(3) of the DA, empowered the court to use its 
discretion to order the division of the assets of the one party as the court deemed fit.  
It must be noted that s 7(6) of the ITA can also be applied under these circumstances, 
                                                            
104 Badenhorst case 258.   
105 Badenhorst case 260I- 261A.  
106 Badenhorst case 261B-C.  
107 Badenhorst case 367.  
108 Badenhorst case 261D-I.  
109 Badenhorst case 262F.  
 41 
where the donor in his capacity as trustee can exercise the power of revocation of a 
donation without reference to the remaining trustees.
110
 A requirement is that the 
trustees should be deprived of their power to distribute income to the beneficiaries. 
The donor should be in de facto control of the discretionary family trust.   
In the case of BC v CC and Another
111
 (hereafter BC case) the wife sought an order in 
divorce proceedings against the husband directing inter alia that the value of the 
assets held by a trust established by the husband be taken into consideration in 
determining the accrual of his estate as provided in s 4 of the Matrimonial Property 
Act 88 of 1984. The court held that where the trust assets are de facto the assets of the 
spouse, the value of the assets held by the spouse on behalf of the trust may be taken 
into account in determining the accrual in the estate of the spouse concerned.
112
 
In the case of Rees and Another v Harris and Another
113
 (hereafter Rees case) the 
court had to decide whether the assets of a trust could effectively be considered to be 
the assets of the trustee. The court held that in appropriate circumstances, the veneer 
of a trust can be disregarded in the same way as the corporate veil of a company. 
Consequently, where special circumstances exist to show that there has been an abuse 
of the trust by the trustee, the veneer must be disregarded.
114
  It follows that if a trust 
is used in an improper fashion by its trustees to commit fraud, the natural person 
behind the trust veneer can be held personally liable.
115
 
The Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereafter TAA) also affects a discretionary 
family trust by providing that a representative taxpayer can be held personally liable 
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in terms of the TAA. Section 155 of the TAA states that a representative taxpayer is 
personally liable for tax payable in the representative taxpayer’s representative 
capacity, if, while it remains unpaid the representative taxpayer alienates, charges or 
disposes of amounts in respect of which tax is chargeable; or the representative 
taxpayer disposes of or parts with funds or moneys which are in the representative 
taxpayer’s possession or come to the representative taxpayer after the tax is payable, 
if the tax could legally have been paid from or out of the funds or moneys. This 
provision aims to prevent the trustee from alienating or disposing of amounts in 
respect of which tax is payable.   
De Waal submits that before one can go behind the trust form, one should be satisfied 
that a valid trust has been created in the first place. In light of the above cases the 
trusts were not shams at all since valid trusts have been created. If it were shams, the 
question whether the courts could go behind the trust form would not be necessary.
116
 
The effect of these cases is that the trust form may be disregarded and the personal 
estate of the estate owner will be larger than planned. The estate owner’s estate may 
then possibly be liable for estate duty upon his death. The plan to create the 
discretionary trust for estate planning purposes would then be unsuccessful. The 
problem that could be encountered in practice is that it is difficult for SARS to be 
aware of situations when the trust form is disregarded or abused by an estate owner. 
The situation must be exposed to SARS by third party creditors (who are aware of the 
trust property actually being the personal property of the estate owner), disappointed 
beneficiaries or former and aggrieved spouses.   
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There are also cases where the courts have decided not to go behind the trust form. In 
these cases the emphasis however fell on the trustees’ conduct in respect of the trust 
administration, their non-compliance with the terms of the trust deeds and the 
breaching of their fiduciary duties.
117
 The relevant cases are Parker and Van der 
Merwe. In short, both cases concerned the validity of legal acts performed by the 
trustees of the respective trusts. In the Parker case one of the issues was the validity 
of loan agreements which purported to bind the trust. The Van der Merwe case dealt 
with the issue of the validity of a contract for the sale of land. In both these cases it 
was held that the acts which the trustees performed were invalid because the trustees 
had acted in contravention of the basic trust law principles as well as the provisions of 
the respective trust deeds. In both these cases the courts considered going behind the 
trust form, but it did not actually happen.
118
 The court in the Parker case did not go 
behind the trust form because the trustees, by reason of incapacity, could not act on 
behalf of the trust. The trust did not validly petition the court nor was it at any stage 
properly before the court.
119
 In the Van der Merwe case the provisions of s 2(1) of the 
Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 made it impossible to go behind the trust form.
120
  
The ‘piercing of the veneer of the trust’ issue is particularly crucial for discretionary 
family trusts since generally, the trustees of the family trust are also the beneficiaries 
of the trust and/ or the founder of the trust is also a trustee of the trust. It is not wrong 
to be in that position but it is important that the legal separation in the ownership 
(control) of the trust property and the enjoyment derived from the trust property be 
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maintained. It is also important that the trustees act in terms of the provisions of the 
trust instrument.
121
  
A lesson that could be learned from the above cases is that, although a trustee can also 
be a beneficiary, the central notion is that the person entrusted with control exercises 
it on behalf of and in the interest of another.
122
  
 
4. SUMMARY 
 
Taxpayers are entitled to arrange their affairs in order to remain outside the provisions 
of taxing statutes. Dishonest intentions of the taxpayer can however be challenged by 
the tax authorities and the courts will not be deceived by the form of such a 
transaction. The court may examine the true nature of the transaction and attach 
adequate tax implications to it. The problem in practice is that it may be difficult for 
SARS to become aware of the dishonest intention of the taxpayer unless it is raised 
with SARS by an interested party, for example a third party creditor, an aggrieved 
beneficiary and former spouse.   
The courts will look at the commercial sense of transactions that were entered into 
and will further determine whether the main purpose of the transaction was to avoid 
liability for tax. The commercial sense of transactions can especially be scrutinised in 
the case of discretionary family trusts, due to the fact that the trustees are 
simultaneously the principal beneficiaries and will have an interest in the obtaining of 
loans. Each case should however be decided on its own merit. It must be noted that if 
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the NWK case is authority for setting aside a transaction as simulated where the aim of 
the transaction is tax avoidance, then it goes against established law, which in 
principle allows transactions that avoid tax.  
The courts can also decide to disregard the trust form and ‘pierce the veneer of the 
trust.’ This can happen if there is no separation between the ownership of the trust 
property and the enjoyment derived from the trust property. The cases that were 
discussed above should sound alarm bells for estate owners and trustees who 
transferred assets to a discretionary family trust with a view to avoid liability for tax 
and who conduct themselves in a manner similar to how the parties treated the trust 
assets in the above discussed cases. If the trust form is disregarded by the court it 
could have far-reaching tax consequences, particularly in relation to income tax and 
estate duty, with trust income and trust assets being regarded as the personal income 
and assets of an estate owner and/or trustee.      
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     CHAPTER 4  
STATUTORY ANTI-TAX AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
TRUSTS  
In Vestey’s Executors v IRC123 (hereafter Vestey’s Executor’s case), Lord Normand 
said:  
‘Parliament in its attempt to keep pace with the ingenuity devoted to tax 
avoidance may fall short of its purpose. That is a misfortune for the 
taxpayers who do not try to avoid their share of the burden, and it is 
disappointing to the Inland Revenue. But the Court will not stretch the 
terms of taxing Acts in order to improve on the efforts of Parliament and 
to stop gaps which are left open by the statutes.’ 124 
 
1.INTRODUCTION 
The taxation of a trust is governed by s 25B of the ITA, in the absence of the 
operation of any of the anti-avoidance provisions in s 7 or sections 80A to 80L 
(general anti-tax-avoidance provisions in the ITA). Sections 80A to 80L of the ITA 
will be briefly discussed in this chapter due to the fact that it contains the general anti-
avoidance provisions of the ITA. Sections 25B and 7 of the ITA will be discussed in 
this chapter since it particularly deals with the taxation of a trust. Furthermore, the 
provisions in the Eighth Schedule of the ITA relating to taxation of capital gains will 
be discussed. This chapter will be concluded by s 3(3)(d) of the EDA.  
                                                            
123(1949) 1 All ER 1108 (HL). 
124 Vestey’s Executors case 1120.  
 47 
Due to the fact that this study is determining the impact of the statutory anti-tax 
avoidance measures on the discretionary family trust, it is also important to state the 
difference between tax avoidance and tax evasion.  Tax avoidance refers to a situation 
in which a taxpayer, within the provisions of a tax statute, arranges his affairs so that 
his tax obligation is minimised or completely avoided. Tax avoidance is not tax 
evasion. Tax evasion is where a taxpayer unlawfully arranges his affairs in a way that 
he escapes from tax liability which he ought to pay.
125
  
 
2. GENERAL ANTI-AVOIDANCE PROVISIONS OF THE ITA  
An estate plan must take cognisance of the so-called ‘general anti-avoidance 
provisions’. This was originally contained in s 103(1) of the ITA, which applied to 
any transaction entered into before 2 November 2006. For s 103(1) to be invoked 
there must be a transaction, operation or scheme, which has the effect of avoiding, 
reducing or postponing any tax referred to; which was entered into in an abnormal 
manner or created abnormal rights and obligations; and which was entered into solely 
or mainly for the purposes of obtaining a tax benefit. Section 103(1) was replaced as 
from 2 November 2006 by sections 80A to 80L of the ITA.. An ‘arrangement’ as 
defined in s 80L of the ITA is considered an impermissible avoidance arrangement if:  
 its sole or main purpose was to obtain a tax benefit;126 
                                                            
125 Section 235 of the TAA states that a person who intent to evade or assist another person to obtain 
an undue refund under a tax Act, is guilty of an offence and, upon conviction, is subject to a fine or to 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.  
126 Section 80A of the ITA. A ‘tax benefit’ is defined in s 80L to include ‘any avoidance, postponement 
or reduction of any liability for tax’.  
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 in the context of business or otherwise it was entered into or carried 
out in a means or manner which would not normally be employed for 
bona fide business purposes other then obtaining a tax benefit or in the 
context of business only, it lacks comnmercial substance.  
There are three tainted elements namely, abnormality,
127
 or a lack of commercial 
substance,
128
 or misuse or abuse of the provisions of the ITA.
129
  
Section 80B of the ITA empowers the Commissioner to take certain action. A general 
remedy is provided in s 80B(f) of the ITA. The Commissioner may in terms of this 
general remedy determine the liability for tax as if the transaction had not been 
entered into or carried out, or alternatively, in such other manner as in the 
circumstances of the case, the Commissioner deems appropriate for the prevention or 
diminution of the relevant tax benefit. The Commissioner is also provided with 
specific remedies to impermissible tax avoidance arrangements. The specific remedies 
are contained in subsections 80B(1)(a) to (e). These specific remedies allow the 
Commissioner to, for example: 
 disregard or combine any steps in the arrangement. 
 deem different parties as one and the same person.  
 re-allocate or re-classify any receipts or accruals, expenditure or rebates. 
The Commissioner must, in terms of s 80B(2) of the ITA, make the necessary and 
appropriate adjustments to the applicable tax liabilities to ensure the consistent 
                                                            
127 Sections 80A (a)(1), 80A(b) and 80A(c)(i).  
128 Section 80A(a)(ii). 
129 Section 80A(a)(ii).  
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treatment of all the parties to the arrangement. These adjustments are subject to 
objection and appeal. It is important to note that the provisions of s 80 of the ITA may 
be applied to any part of an arrangement or to the arrangement as a whole.
130
    
Section 80C of the ITA provides a general rule for determining whether an avoidance 
arrangement lacks commercial substance for the purpose of s 80A, as well as a non-
exclusive set of characteristics that serve as indicators of a lack of commercial sense. 
The general rule is that an avoidance arrangement lacks commercial substance if it 
results in a significant tax benefit for a party but does not have a significant effect 
upon either the business risks or the net cash flow of that party.
131
 Examples of lack of 
commercial substance according to s 80C(2) include: 
 Situations where the legal substance of a transaction differs from the legal 
form; or  
 round trip financing is present;132 or 
 a tax-indifferent party, as described in s 80E, is introduced as part of the 
arrangement; or 
 elements are present that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other. 
Section 80D of the ITA provides a description of round trip financing. This essentially 
relates to a transfer of funds between parties that results in a tax benefit and a 
significant reduction, offset or elimination of business risk.   
                                                            
130 Section 80H of the ITA.  
131 Section 80 (C).  
132 Section 80D of the ITA.  
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The essential question that exists is whether this detailed structure that SARS has 
sought to put into legislation will materially alter the position which pertained under     
s 103 of the ITA. To answer this question, two key cases need to be considered. In 
CIR v Conhage (Pty) Ltd 
133
 (hereafter Conhage case) the court accepted the argument 
that a sale and lease back transaction could serve the dual purpose of providing the 
taxpayer with capital and still take advantage of tax benefits to be derived from the 
particular type of transaction. In the Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith case, the court was 
confronted with a property structure in which use was made of an independent 
pension fund to ensure that a land owner could ensure that a factory was constructed 
on its land in circumstances where the lessee could deduct the cost of construction 
without the land owner being taxed in terms of paragraph (h) of the definition of 
‘gross income’. The court examined the nature of the agreements and the intention of 
the parties thereto. It determined the true nature of the various agreements and held 
that the taxpayer had acquired a right to have improvements affected on his land. The 
court did not follow a ‘substance over form’ approach but followed established legal 
principle in examining the true intention of the parties as evidenced in the agreement.  
These two decisions have clear implications for the new s 80A of the ITA. In the first 
place it would be doubtful that Conhage would be differently decided under s 80A. 
The transaction was held to have commercial substance because it constituted a 
lending agreement between arms length parties. Although a tax saving purpose was 
found to exist, the essence of the transaction was that of commercial lending. Hence, 
it is difficult to see how the commercial substance could be found to be lacking 
because it did not hold significant business risks for the borrower. The court in the 
                                                            
133 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA).  
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Conhage case thus examined the transaction from the perspective of a commercial 
rationale, or expressed in the language of the new section, the commercial substance 
of the transaction. Viewed in this manner, it is doubtful whether the new section 
would produce a different result in that the court would examine the test for 
commercial substance as did the court in Conhage. 
In Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith the court did not embrace a ‘substance over form’ doctrine 
but it did affirm that the nature of a contract and thus the true nature of the 
arrangements could be tested not by its legal form alone but in terms of the intention 
of the parties which gave rise to the contracts. Viewed within the context of the new 
legislation, this judgment could be invoked by SARS to attack transactions where the 
true nature of the arrangements is obfuscated by a series of agreements.  
Two further considerations operate in favour of the conclusion that, all the detailed 
provisions of section 80C to 80E of the ITA notwithstanding little material change 
will occur from the tax avoidance jurisprudence which developed in terms of s 103(1) 
of the ITA. First, the distinction between normality and purpose is retained. That 
means that a taxpayer can have a sole or main purpose of avoiding tax but still argue 
that nothing is abnormal in the transaction.  Secondly, on the basis of s 80G of the 
ITA, the onus to prove abnormality still rest on SARS .  
 The NWK case casts some doubt on whether ss 80 A to 80L of the ITA will continue 
to have significant practical effect. The court extended the test for simulated 
transactions beyond that which was set out in the older cases. The dictum appears to 
confuse the concepts of tax evasion with tax avoidance. It also classified a transaction 
as simulated once it is designed to achieve a situation where less tax is payable than 
otherwise would be the case. This is an extremely wide notion of a simulated 
 52 
transaction as previously understood. This extension provides SARS with so wide 
power to attack transactions that seek to save, reduce or defer tax so far as to render 
the application of ss 80 A to 80 L almost redundant. 
134
  
The general anti-avoidance provisions of the ITA could apply to discretionary family 
trusts in the event of interest free loans being made to the trust by the founder. An 
interest free loan arrangement would not have any commercial substance. A 
discretionary family trust can also be held liable in terms of s 80C(2) if they enter into 
transactions where the legal substance differs from the legal form. 
 
3.SECTION 25B OF THE ITA  
Section 25B(1) of the ITA states:  
‘Any amount received by or accrued to or in favour of any person during 
any year of assessment in his or capacity as the trustee of a trust, shall, 
subject to the provisions of section 7, to the extent to which that amount 
has been derived for the immediate or future benefit of any ascertained 
beneficiary who has a vested right to that amount during that year, be 
deemed to be an amount which has accrued to that beneficiary, and to 
the extent to which that amount is not so derived.’ 
The obtaining by a trustee of the control of the trust assets that are to be held and 
utilised for the benefit of beneficiaries, cannot on general principles, qualify as a 
                                                            
134 Emslie T ‘Simulated Transactions- NWK revisited’ Vol 60 No.2 2011 The Taxpayer 23.   
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receipt or an accrual in the trustee’s hands.135 A beneficiary may, also in addition, 
have a vested right or unconditional right to a trust asset or to the fruits of a trust 
asset.
136
  
In Lategan v CIR
137
 the court held that an amount accrues as soon as a taxpayer 
becomes entitled to it. In terms of the entitlement principle, an amount accrues to a 
taxpayer when he becomes entitled to claim payment (personal right) even if only at a 
future date. This view was accepted in the case of CIR v People’s Stores (Walvis Bay) 
(Pty) Ltd.
138
 In ITC 1552
139
 the court stated that in the income tax sense, a vested right 
was an accrued right.  
The position is however somewhat more complex in the case of other trusts where 
beneficiaries only acquire vested rights upon the exercise of a discretionary power by 
the trustee(s) or upon the happening of some other uncertain event. Where trust 
beneficiaries acquire no unconditional rights to any trust asset acquired by the trustee, 
that asset can clearly not qualify as having accrued to or having been received by any 
beneficiary. The question of the status of such assets as well as whether they can be 
treated as having accrued to the trust, in spite of the fact that a trust is not a legal 
persona at common law, was finally settled in the case of Friedman NNO v CIR: In 
Re Phillip Frame Will Trust v CIR
140
 (hereafter Friedman case). 
                                                            
135 Swart G ‘The taxation of trusts-superimposing new rules on old principles’ 2002 Acta Juridica 
102 110.  
136Greenberg v Estate Greenberg 1955 (3) SA 361 (A) 364-65. 
137 1926 CPD 203 209.  
138 1990 (2) SA 353 (A) 367 C-D. 
139 (1989) 55 SATC 96 97. 
1401991 (2) SA 340 (WLD). 
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The Friedman case dealt with the issue whether a trust is a ‘person’ and therefore a 
taxable entity for purposes of the ITA.
141
 The court held that in the absence of any 
express provisions in the ITA constituting a trust a ‘person’, or taxable entity for 
purposes of the ITA, the court did not consider that any liability for tax in respect of 
the undistributed income of a trust was created by the ITA. If this is a lacuna in the 
ITA it is a matter which can obviously only be cured by legislation.
142
 Section 25B (1) 
was then introduced into the ITA. 
A trust is currently defined as a ‘person’ for tax purposes.  The treatment of a trust as 
a person is very different from the tax treatment of companies and close 
corporations.
143
 This is because even though amounts may be received by a trust, 
these receipts may not be taxed in the trust at all but taxed in the hands of the 
beneficiaries of the trust.
144
 In these circumstances, rather than be regarded as a 
person a trust would be described as a conduit or a channel through which income and 
capital gains flow through to the beneficiaries. In the case of Armstrong v CIR
145
 the 
court held that the ‘conduit principle’ rests upon sound and robust common sense for 
treating the intervening trustee as a mere administrative conduit-pipe. The effect of 
the conduit principle is that double tax is avoided, as the income is not taxed in the 
hands of both the trustees and the beneficiaries. Section 25B(2) of the ITA provides 
that where trust income is vested in a beneficiary as a result of the exercise of a 
discretion by the trustees, the beneficiary will be taxed.  
                                                            
141 Friedman case 341.  
142 Friedman case 344.  
143 Geach (2007) 133.  
144 Section 25B of the ITA.  
145 1938 AD 343 348.  
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It is thus important to note that if the income is not vested in the beneficiary in a 
particular year, as is sometimes the case in a discretionary family trust, the trust will 
be taxed and not the beneficiary. The beneficiary of a discretionary family trust is thus 
only liable for income tax once the trust income is vested in him. Trusts other than 
special trusts are however subject to the maximum marginal rate of tax
146
 and it would 
thus be advisable to vest the trust income in the beneficiaries in order for the income 
to be taxed in their hands and at a lower rate since the income will be split amongst 
the beneficiaries. This should however only be done if the estate owner wishes to 
preserve the income of the trust. A discussion will later follow as to when the ‘donor’ 
to a trust will be taxed and not the trust or the beneficiary.    
Section 25B(3) of the ITA provides that any deductions or allowance that is available 
and taken into account in the determination of taxable income, shall to the extent to 
which such income is deemed under s 25B(1) to be the income of the beneficiary or 
the trust, be deemed to be a deduction or an allowance which may be made in 
determining the taxable income of the beneficiary or the trust as the case may be.  
Under s 25B(4) trust deductions incurred by the trust and allowances to which the 
trust might have been entitled are limited to the amount of the income received from 
the trust. Section 25B(5) provides that any excess has to be claimed by the trust in the 
same year of assessment. Section 25B(6) provides that in the event of the trust not 
having sufficient taxable income to make use of the deductions and allowances, the 
beneficiary may claim the excess in the subsequent year of assessment. Where the 
trust is not subject to tax in South Africa, the excess may be carried forward to the 
subsequent year of assessment to be used by the beneficiary. In addition, it is provided 
                                                            
146 An ordinary trust is taxed on 66 per cent of a capital gain at a rate of 40 per cent. ‘Trusts’ available 
at http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed on 6 November 2013).     
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that the limitations will not be applicable to a beneficiary who is not subject to tax in 
South Africa.
147
 
 
4. COUNTER THE USE OF OFFSHORE TRUSTS   
Section 25B(2A) of the ITA provides that a SA resident
148
 beneficiary will be taxed 
where he acquires a vested right to capital of a non-SA resident trust, and the capital 
arose from income received by or accrued to the trust; or receipts and accruals which 
would have constituted income if the trust had been a SA resident in a previous year 
of assessment during which such resident had a contingent right to such income or 
receipts and accruals. This section aims to counter the manipulation by trustees of the 
residency of a trust in order to avoid tax liability in SA.  
For s 25B(2A) to operate, it is essential that the beneficiary in whom the capital is 
vested had a contingent right to the income in the year that it accrued to the trust.
149
 
The wording of s 25B(2A)(a)(ii) makes it clear that s25B(2A) applies to foreign 
amounts. Section 25B(2A) is however not only applicable to foreign amounts. It is 
clear from s 25B(2A)(i) that it also applies to SA  source amounts. However, as in 
most instances such amounts will be ‘subject to tax’ in SA in terms of the other 
provisions of the ITA, it will be excluded by s 25B(2A)(b). It is clear from                        
s 25B(2A)(b) that if the accumulated foreign amount has been subject to tax in SA in 
terms of s 7(5) or s 7(8) of the ITA it cannot be taxed again in terms of s 25B(2A). 
Double taxation is therefore averted. Accordingly, it will only be in those 
                                                            
147Section 25 B(7) of the ITA. 
148 Section 1 of the ITA. As far as trusts are concerned, a resident trust is a trust established or formed 
in SA, or a trust that has its place of effective management in SA.  
149 Section 25 B(2A)(a) of the ITA.  
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circumstances where the pre-conditions for the operation of s 7(5) and s 7(8) have not 
been met that s25B (2A) will come into the picture. For example, there has been a 
donation, settlement or other disposition.. It is important to note that for s 25B(2A) to 
operate, it is not necessary for a ‘donation, settlement or other disposition’ be made to 
the trust, which is a requirement for the specific anti-avoidance provisions in s 7 to 
apply. 
The formation of discretionary offshore trusts is becoming increasingly popular with 
SA residents, and there are a significant number of SA residents who have set up 
trusts offshore in which the majority of beneficiaries are resident in SA.
150
 When a 
trust is set up in a low tax jurisdiction, this often results in some tax advantages that 
the founder’s country of residence may curtail. A trust is a taxable entity in SA. 
However, if a trust is formed in an offshore jurisdiction, SA cannot tax its income, 
unless it is distributed to resident beneficiaries. But if an offshore trust is effectively 
managed in SA, in that the trustees carry out the day-to-day management of the trust 
in the SA, SA may apply the residence basis of taxation to tax the worldwide income 
of that trust.  
The meaning of place of effective management (hereafter POEM) was considered in 
the case of Oceanic Trust Co Ltd NO v the Commissioner
151
 (hereafter Oceanic case).  
Oceanic Trust is a Mauritian company registered and incorporated under the company 
laws of Mauritius with its principal place of business in Port Louis Mauritius. Oceanic 
Trust was the sole trustee of a trust, Specialised Insurance Solutions (Mauritius) 
(‘SISM’), which was established and registered on 23 November 2000 in 
                                                            
150Mhlongo T ‘The efficacy of trusts in the current legislative climate’ (2002) ITJ Vol. 17 (2) 9. 
151
 74 SATC 127.  
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Mauritius.
152
 SISM conducted business from its inception in 2000 until 2006. During 
the period of its business operations, SISM prepared financial accounts and rendered 
income tax returns to the revenue authorities in Mauritius.
153
 SISM considered 
throughout that it only had tax obligations in Mauritius and that it did not have any tax 
obligations in SA. On 4 March 2006 SISM received a notice of audit in terms of          
s74A of the ITA from SARS informing it that SARS intended conducting an 
audit/inspection of SISM and requesting certain information from SISM.  
SISM provided certain information to SARS and SARS thereupon issued a letter 
stating that it believed that it had a tax claim against SISM and asked for reasons why 
SISM should not be taxed. On 20 July 2009 SARS issued an assessment letter 
wherein it raised an assessment of income tax, additional tax and interest for the tax 
years 2000 to 2007 for R1.5 billion. One of the bases for the assessment was that 
SISM was a ‘resident’ in SA because it had its POEM in SA and that it derived 
income from a SA source which was not exempt from tax. A further, alternative basis 
for the assessment was that SISM derived income from a SA source and that it carried 
on business through a permanent establishment in SA within the meaning of               
s 10(1)(h) of the ITA.
154
 SISM submitted that its management decisions would have 
been taken by its sole trustee (i.e. Oceanic Trust) and that such decisions would have 
been made in Mauritius.  
The court held that the relevant key features relating to the POEM of an entity are the 
following
155
:  
                                                            
152 Oceanic Trust case 128.  
153 Oceanic Trust case 128.  
154 Oceanic case 129.  
155 Oceanic case 146.  
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 the POEM is the place where key management and commercial 
decisions that are necessary for the conduct of the entity’s business are 
in substance made;  
 the POEM will ordinarily be the place where the most senior group of 
persons (e.g. board of directors) make its decisions, where the actions 
to be taken by the entity as a whole are determined; 
 no definite rule can be given and all relevant facts and circumstances 
must be considered to determine the POEM of an entity;  
 although there may be more than one place of management, there may 
only be one POEM at any one time.  
Unfortunately, the judge in the Oceanic case did not go on to conclude on whether or 
not the trust had its POEM in SA (and hence whether it was then a ‘resident’ as 
defined in SA). Despite this, the judgement is relevant in that it provides guidance to 
taxpayers as to the view likely to be adopted by a court in applying the POEM 
concept.  
The court in the Oceanic case relied on the UK decision of Commissioner for Her 
Majesty’s Revenue and Customs v Smallwood and Another,156 which dealt with 
POEM as applied in a double taxation agreement.  
SARS’ approach to the term POEM157 is the place where the company is managed on 
a regular or day to day basis by directors or senior managers of the company, 
                                                            
156 (2010) EWCA Civ 778.  
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irrespective of where the overriding control is exercised, or where the board of 
directors meets. The focus is therefore on the location where policy and strategic 
decisions are executed and implemented by a company’s senior management, rather 
than the place where the ultimate authority over the company is exercised by its board 
of directors or similar body.
158
 
In order to determine a legal person’s POEM from a practical point of view, the three 
steps set out in Interpretation Note 6 need to be followed:
159
 
 If the management functions are executed at a single location, that single 
location will constitute the legal person’s POEM; 
 If all the management functions are executed from different locations, one 
would determine the location where the day to day management and 
commercial decisions taken by senior management are actually implemented. 
This will be the location where the actual business operations of the company 
are carried out; and 
 If both steps above do not provide a definite answer, one would determine the 
‘place with the strongest economic nexus’. 
In addition to the three steps above, SARS provides certain factors that need to be 
considered when determining a legal person’s POEM. These factors include inter 
alia, where the business operations are actually conducted and where the centre of top 
                                                                                                                                                                          
157 Interpretation Note 6: Resident: Place of Effective Management (Persons other than natural 
person) issued on 26 March 2002 available at http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed 17 November 2013) 
(hereafter Interpretation Note 6).  
158 Interpretation note 6 3.  
159 Jonker J ‘Place of effective management- A South African Perspective’ (Unpublished LLM thesis, 
University of Pretoria, 2012).  
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level management is located. It is reiterated that these factors do not constitute an 
exhaustive list, but only acts as guidelines to be followed. 
SARS has provided its view on the approach to locating the POEM of a company, 
while the Oceanic case provided guidance on the approach to locating the POEM in 
general. These approaches show a range of interpretations- the POEM is located 
where the company is managed on a regular day-to-day basis and operations are 
implemented, or where the shots are called, or where the Board of Directors meet on 
the business of the company, or where the central executive management is located. 
The different views illustrate two possible approaches, either through looking for the 
‘directing mind’ of the company or looking at the rules of the company as found in its 
documents, the common law and legislation.
160
 The first approach would attribute 
certain ‘human’ characteristics to the company by seeking to find the ‘mind’ which 
effectively manages it. The second approach would scrutinise the company’s 
founding document and the relevant law to determine which person or body is 
empowered to ‘effectively manage’ the company in terms of its rules. The first 
approach can also be referred to ‘de facto’ POEM, while the latter can be referred to 
as the ‘legal POEM’. In applying the first, an attempt would be made to find the 
directing mind of the company, in locating where the shots are called. If the approach 
is based on examining the rules, it would commence by looking at the company’s 
founding documents, the case law relating to its actions and decisions and the relevant 
legislation by which it is governed.
161
          
                                                            
160 Gutuza T ‘Has recent United Kingdom case law affected the interplay between ‘place of effective 
management’ and controlled foreign companies’? 2012 SA Merc LJ 424 427 (hereafter Gutuza T 
(2012) SA Merc LJ).  
161 Gutuza T (2012) SA Merc LJ 429.  
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These approaches appear to indicate, though under a different test for residence, that 
the starting point of attributing a characteristic to a company can either be to locate 
the ‘directing mind’ of that company, or to look at the rules which give it legal 
personality and regulate its actions. Gutuza submits that although the identification of 
these approaches would indicate the need for a choice, the approaches can be 
reconciled.
162
 
The effect that the interpretation of the POEM has on the discretionary family trust is 
that the POEM can be established by taking into account the above steps as set out in 
the Interpretation Notes. The trustees may then be liable for tax if it is found that the 
discretionary family trust’s POEM is in SA.  
 
5. SECTION 7 OF THE ITA  
Where the income arising in the trust can be linked to a donation made by a donor, the 
deeming provisions of s 7 of the ITA will apply because the provisions of s 25B are 
subject to s 7 of the ITA.
163
 
The ITA thus seeks to prevent income splitting. The income accruing to the trust is 
drawn into the hands of the beneficiary with a vested right in terms of s 25B of the 
ITA. The income will be taxed there unless the income has accrued by reason of a 
donor’s donation with the main or sole purpose of avoiding tax. Where this is the 
                                                            
162 Gutuza T (2012) SA Merc LJ 430.  
163 Section 25B of the ITA.  
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case, the deeming provisions in s 7 of the ITA will draw the income into the hands of 
the donor to be taxed there.
164
 
Section 7 of the ITA was introduced to curb specific tax avoidance schemes. Section 
7 is specifically targeting assets which are donated by a donor to another person with 
the idea of avoiding tax in his own hands on the profits derived from these assets. 
Whenever one of the subsections of s 7 is applicable, income will not be taxed in the 
hands of the trustees or the trust beneficiaries, but in those of the donor. Furthermore, 
for this section to apply the donor must still be alive at the year end.   
In order for any of the deeming provisions of s 7 of the ITA to apply, a person must 
have made a donation, settlement or other gratuitous disposition. For estate planning 
purposes, it is thus imperative to understand what is meant by the terms ‘donation, 
settlement or other disposition’, as it is used in s 7 of the ITA. The term ‘donation’ 
has the normal acceptable meaning of donation. It is a wholly gratuitous disposition 
and it contains no element of commerciality.
165
 In Estate Welch v Commissioner
166
 
the court found that the distinguishing characteristic of a donation was that the 
disposition was motivated by ‘pure liberality or disinterested benevolence’. This is 
consistent with the decision reached in Ovenstone v Secretary for Inland Revenue 
(hereafter SIR)
167
 (hereafter Ovenstone case) where the court indicated that as soon as 
an element of quid pro quo is introduced into a transaction there is no donation.
168
 
With regards to the term ‘settlement’ the court in Joss v SIR169 held that the term 
                                                            
164 Carroll E ‘ SARS’ ability to attribute trust income and capital gains to a donor-parent’ (Unpublished 
LLM Thesis) North West University (2010) 9 (hereafter Carroll E (2010)).  
165 Olivier PA, Strydom S and Van den Berg GPJ Trust Law and Practice 2ed (2006) 7-19.   
166 2004 (2) SA 586 (SCA) 593.  
167 1980 (2) SA 721 (A).  
168 Ovenstone case 736H. 
169 1980 (1) SA 674 (T) (hereafter Joss case).  
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‘settlement’ did not include transactions ‘made for full value or money’s worth’.170 A 
similar conclusion was reached in the case of Ovenstone. The court found that while a 
settlement could be made for full value, the type of settlement envisaged by s 7(3) of 
the ITA was the type which was made ‘gratuitously out of liberality or generosity’171 
and as such ‘it was part of the same genus as a donation’.172 The interpretation lead 
the court to decide that settlements made for full consideration would be of a purely 
commercial nature and therefore, fall outside of the scope of s 7(3) of the ITA. The 
term ‘other disposition’ should also be limited to dispositions of a gratuitous nature.173 
An example of a gratuitous disposition would be a donation of property to a 
discretionary family trust. Any income, such as rental arising from that property, 
would then be deemed to be income of a person other than the person to whom the 
income accrues.
174
 
Sections 7(5) and 7(6) of the ITA are specifically applicable to discretionary family 
trusts. However, for the sake of completeness, the other sections of s 7 of the ITA will 
also be discussed.  
 
5.1 Section 7(2) of the ITA : Income is deemed to be that of the spouse 
There are many provisions in tax laws that provide that transactions between spouses 
have no tax consequences. For example, a donation from one spouse to another,
175
 
transactions between spouses do not have to be taken into account as gains for capital 
                                                            
170 Joss case 680F.  
171 Ovenstone case 737 A-G.  
172 Ovenstone case 737 A-G.  
173 Ovenstone case 737E.  
174 Geach (2007) 245.  
175 Section 56(1)(a) of the ITA.  
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gains purposes,
176
 and bequests to a surviving spouse are not subject to estate duty.
177
 
However, when one spouse’s income is higher than the other spouse’s income, there 
can be temptation to ensure that the income or gain of one spouse is treated as the 
income or gain of the other. In this way income or gains could be taxed in a manner 
beneficial to the taxpayer. In order to prevent tax avoidance in these circumstances,    
s 7(2) deems the income of one spouse to be that of the other spouse to the extent that 
it is not self-earned but arises as a result of a donation, settlement or disposition of the 
other spouse. In the context of trusts, the application of s 7(2) will ensure that if a 
spouse has received some income benefit from a trust, and the real cause of this 
benefit is a donation, settlement or some other gratuitous disposal by the other spouse, 
the donor will have to take the income into account for tax purposes, and not the 
spouse who received the income or to whom the income accrued.
178
  
The impact of this provision can be illustrated by way of an example. If the donor 
spouse forms a discretionary family inter vivos trust and donates income generating 
assets to the trust for the benefit of the donee spouse, any income which accrues to the 
donee spouse in consequence of the donation will be deemed to be that of the donor 
spouse, provided that the main purpose of the donor spouse was to reduce, postpone 
or avoid paying tax. Section 7(2) of the ITA specifically deems these profits to be 
taxed in the hands of the donor and not in the hands of the spouse.
179
 
 
                                                            
176 Paragraph 67 of the Eight Schedule to the ITA.  
177 Section 4(q) of the EDA.  
178 Paragraph 68 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA deems gains received by one spouse to be that of 
the other in similar circumstances to those described here.  
179 ‘Does section 7 of the Income Tax Act form part of your annual tax planning?’ available at 
http://www.tenkloubser.co.za (accessed 6 November 2013) (hereafter ‘Tenk Loubser article’).  
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5.2 Section 7(3) of the ITA: Income is deemed to be that of a parent of a minor  
Section 7(3) of the ITA provides if a minor child or stepchild receives income as a 
result of a donation, settlement or gratuitous disposition by the child’s parent, the 
income is deemed to be that of the parent for income tax purposes. Section 7(3) can 
apply to income distributed or allocated to a minor beneficiary of a trust as is 
illustrated in the example below. 
The founder of a discretionary family trust donates a profit-making investment to the 
trust and at year-end the trustees of the trust distribute the profits from his investment 
to his minor child, being in a lower tax bracket than himself. This way he avoids 
being taxed on these profits in his personal capacity, being at a higher marginal rate. 
Section 7(3) of the ITA provides that the donor will be taxed in his own hands on 
these profits and not the minor child.
180
 
In Commissioner v Woolidge,
181
 (hereafter Woolidge case) the court held that for         
s 7(3) to apply, there had to be a disposition wholly or, to an appreciable extent, 
gratuitously out of liberality or generosity.
182
 In this case shares were sold to a trust at 
their market value but the selling price was left outstanding on loan account. The 
court held that where the disposition contained both appreciable elements of 
gratuitousness (interest-free loan) and proper consideration (the sale of shares at 
market value), an apportionment could be made between the two elements for the 
purpose of determining the income deemed to have accrued to a parent under s 7(3) of 
the ITA.   
                                                            
180 Tenk Loubser article. 
181 1999 (4) SA 519 (C) 527.  
182 Woolidge case 527. 
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5.3 Section 7(4) of the ITA: Income deemed to be that of parent of minor child  
Section 7(4) of the ITA deals with the situation where the reason for the income being 
received by or accruing to a minor is a donation made by a third person who, or 
whose family, in turn, is the recipient of a donation or other consideration from the 
minor’s parent. The income received by or accruing to the minor child is deemed to 
be the parent’s. This provision prevents the circumvention of s 7(3) of the ITA.     
 
5.4 Section 7(5): Income is deemed to be that of a donor   
Section 7(5) of the ITA provides that if any person has made a donation, settlement or 
other disposition which is subject to a stipulation or condition, whether made or 
imposed by that person or by anybode else, to the effect that the beneficiaries or some 
of them shall not receive the income or some portion of the income until the 
happening of some event, fixed or contingent, then so much of the income as would, 
but for the stipulation or condition, be received by or accrued to or in favour of the 
beneficiary in consequence of the donation, settlement or disposition, is deemed to be 
the income of the maker of the donation, settlement or disposition until the happening 
of the event or until his death, whichever takes place first. If someone has made a 
donation of an asset to a trust and if the trustees decide to retain and accumulate the 
income from the donation in the trust, then the provisions of s 7(5) of the ITA can 
deem that income to be that of the donor in certain circumstances. If the income arises 
as a result of a donation or interest free loan, and if this income will only be 
distributed to beneficiaries upon the happening of some event or when the trustees in 
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their discretion decide to distribute it, then the income is deemed to be that of the 
person who made the loan or who made the interest free loan.   
An example of this provision is when the donor donates an investment to his 
discretionary family trust and decides not to distribute the profits to the beneficiaries 
but to rather retain the profits within the trust. The impact of this provision is that the 
donor will be liable for income tax. This provision will particularly have an effect on 
a discretionary family trust in the sense that if the profits of the investment (as in the 
above example) are not distributed to the beneficiaries then the donor will be taxed. 
The result would then be that the trust’s income will remain intact and the trust estate 
will grow. This is particularly good if the intention of the estate owner is to increase 
the value of the trust estate and to reduce the value of his personal estate.  
In the case of Estate Dempers v SIR
183
 the court laid down the following guideline to 
test whether income should be taxed within the ambit of s 7(5) of the ITA: 
‘The question which the court must ask itself is whether in the 
absence of the stipulation withholding trust income, this income 
would have been received by or accrued to the beneficiary. In 
answering this question regard must be had to the terms of the 
instrument generally, the donor’s benevolent intention as evinced 
by the terms of the instrument and all the relevant circumstances. 
In this enquiry the fact that in terms of the instrument as a whole 
the beneficiary has a vested right to the income, would, as I have 
                                                            
183 1977 (3) SA 410 (A) (hereafter Estate Dempers case). 
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indicated, be an important factor but it would not be the sole 
touchstone.’184  
The ‘event’ usually giving rise to an application of s 7(5) of the ITA is the death of 
some person or the reaching of a certain age. Whether the exercise by a trustee of his 
discretion, in the case of a discretionary trust, is an ‘event’ within the meaning of        
s 7(5) has yet to be finally adjudicated upon. An affirmative answer was given in 
Hullett v CIR.
185
  
What is clear from this section is that where income accrues to a trust in a particular 
year and the trustee in his discretion distributes that income to a beneficiary in that 
year, section 7(5) of the ITA has no application to that income. Trustees should 
therefore ensure that they exercise their discretion before the year end. Once income 
is deemed to be the donor’s in terms of s 7(5) of the ITA, it is not taxable in the hands 
of the beneficiaries when subsequently distributed to them. 
 
5.5 Section 7(6) of the ITA: Income is deemed to be that of a person who 
retains powers  
In terms of s 7(6) of the ITA, if a person makes a donation to a trust or makes an 
interest free loan to a trust, and the donor or lender retains the powers to vary or 
change the beneficiaries who are entitled to receive any income resulting from that 
donation or loan, then the income that is received by any beneficiary will be deemed 
to be that of the donor or lender for as long as the donor or lender retains the powers 
                                                            
184 Estate Dempers case 426. 
185 13 SATC 58. 
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to vary or change the beneficiaries.
186
 This section accordingly applies to a donor who 
confers a right of income and retains the power to revoke that gift of income and 
confer it upon another. The right of a donor to require the income to be lent to the 
donor may also be a right as envisaged by this section. This is because the substance 
of such a right is that the trustees are deprived of the power to distribute such income. 
This section may also apply if a donor retains the power to amend a trust deed.
187
 
Section 7(6) of the ITA applies when a person seeks to avoid or reduce tax by 
disposing of an income- producing asset while retaining control over the income 
generated from that asset.
188
  
Section 7(6) can be invoked only where the beneficiary has a vested right to receive 
income subject to a power of revocation being reserved by the donor. Where a donor 
in his capacity as trustee can exercise the power of revocation without reference to the 
remaining trustees, s 7(6) of the ITA would apply. 
 
5.6 Section 7(7) of the ITA: Income is deemed to be that of a person who 
retains an interest in property 
If a person donates or otherwise gratuitously disposes of property to a trust but retains 
the right to regain ownership of that property at some time in the future, then any 
income from that property is, in terms of s 7(7) of the ITA, deemed to be that of the 
person who retains the right to regain that property. If an asset is gratuitously 
transferred to a trust for a certain period of time, but will then revert back to the 
                                                            
186 Geach (2007) 249.  
187 Geach (2007) 249.  
188 Apart from the application of s 7(6) in the circumstances envisaged by s 7(6), there are also the 
estate duty implications of s 3(3)(d) of the EDA.  
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person who disposed of it at some time in the future, any rental, interest, royalties or 
similar income that is earned by the trust (whether or not the income is distributed to 
the beneficiaries) will be taxed in the hands of the person who is entitled to regain that 
property.
189
 
5.7 Section 7(8) of the ITA: Income is deemed to be that of a resident 
Section 7(8) of the ITA is aimed at the avoidance of tax where a South African 
resident shifts income into the hands of non- residents (particularly offshore trusts) by 
disposing of income- generating assets to a non- resident.  
Section 7(8)(a) of the ITA states that where by reason of or in consequence of any 
donation made by any resident, any amount is received by or accrued to any person 
who is not a resident, which would have constituted income had that person been a 
resident, there shall be included in the income of that resident so much of that amount 
as is attributable to that donation. This section hampers estate owners to donate assets 
to a person or trust that is not a resident, since he or she will be liable for the tax.  
 
5.8 Certain disposals to a trust can be regarded as donations  
An estate owner must also take s 7(9) of the ITA into consideration when he or she 
intends on making a donation. Estate owners should borne in mind that if it is 
discovered that assets were disposed to a discretionary family trust for a consideration 
that is less than the market value in order to try to avoid or limit paying estate duty, 
the court may regard the disposal as a donation and donations tax may be payable. 
                                                            
189 Geach (2007) 249.  
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The donor of the assets to the discretionary family trust may thus be held liable to pay 
tax. It must however be established that tax avoidance is the sole or main aim of the 
donation. 
 
 
5.9 Disclosure in tax return  
Section 7(10) further places an obligation on an estate owner who is a resident and 
who makes a disposition that falls within s 7 to disclose this fact in his or her income 
tax return and furnish any further information requested by the Commissioner. 
One of the reasons why discretionary family trusts are popular is the effect of the anti-
avoidance provisions which are contained in s 7 of the ITA. These tax-back or 
attribution provisions, to the extent that they are applicable to donations and other 
similar dispositions to a discretionary family trust, have the effect that the estate 
owner or a donor to a trust, as opposed to a trust itself, will pay any income tax arising 
from income earned by the trust by reason of or in consequence of any donation to the 
trust. The result is that the trust’s income and assets are preserved and are effectively 
increased to the extent that the estate owner or donor pays the tax and does not 
reclaim such tax from the trust. Similar considerations apply with regards to capital 
gains. Consequently, in circumstances where the estate owner or donor wishes to 
reduce his estate and increase the estate of the discretionary family trust, he should 
ensure that the tax-back or attribution provisions of s 7 of the ITA and or the tax- back 
 73 
or attribution provisions of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA do indeed apply (as 
opposed to avoid their application).
190
  
 
6.CGT     
The introduction of CGT, with effect from 1 October 2001,
191
 has had a profound 
impact on the field of estate planning. The reason underlying this statement can be 
attributed to the fact that the death of a person will have both CGT and estate duty 
consequences.
192
 CGT is triggered by an event, being the disposal
193
 or deemed 
disposal of an asset during a year of assessment. On disposal of an asset a capital gain 
or capital loss is calculated by subtracting the base cost
194
 of the asset from the 
proceeds.
195
 
From an estate planning perspective death is regarded as a CGT event.
196
 In terms of 
paragraph 40 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA a deceased person, subject to certain 
exceptions, is regarded as having disposed of all his assets to his estate at their market 
value on the date of his or her death. The financial consequences of an estate being 
subjected to both CGT and estate duty simultaneously have reinforced the case in 
favour of acquiring growth assets in a discretionary family trust or transferring 
existing growth assets to a discretionary family trust. The benefit of doing this from a 
CGT perspective is that no CGT will arise in the event of the death of the estate 
owner once the asset is held by the discretionary family trust because there is no 
                                                            
190 Honiball & Olivier (2009) 199.   
191 Taxation Laws Amendment Act 5 of 2001 (TLAA).   
192 Olivier PA, Strydom S & Van den Berg GPJ Trust Law and Practice 2 ed (2006) 8-20.   
193 The term ‘disposal’ is defined in paragraph 11 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
194 The term ‘base cost’ is set out in Part V of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
195 The term ‘proceeds’ is set out in Part VI of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
196 Stein M Estate Duty: Principles and Planning 3ed (2004) 14.2 and 14.4.  
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disposal or deemed disposal of an asset by the trust at that stage. CGT may however 
have been payable on the disposal of an existing asset to the trust.
197
 The transfer of 
an asset cannot however be undertaken lightly because the CGT implications of using 
trusts are extremely complex. 
Before considering the attribution rules it is necessary to give a brief overview of the 
capital gains tax provisions as they apply to trusts. 
6.1 Overview of trusts and CGT  
The calculation of CGT takes place in terms of what is referred to in the SARS 
Comprehensive Guide to CGT
198
 (hereafter SARS CGT guide) as the core rules. The 
core rules set out the steps for calculating capital gains and losses and indicate the 
gain to be included in a taxpayer’s taxable income in terms of s 26A of the ITA. 
Section 26A ensures that any taxable capital gain that is not deemed
199
 to be that of a 
beneficiary or of a donor in relation to a trust must be included in the taxable income 
of the trust. The capital gains tax rules are contained in the provisions of the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA. It is important to determine whether the capital gain will be 
regarded as having been made by a trust or by a beneficiary of that trust or by a donor 
in relation to that trust for capital gains tax purposes.
200
 The connected person rule
201
 
applies when there are transactions between a trust and a beneficiary or between a 
                                                            
197 Paragraph 11(1) of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA.  
198 SARS: Comprehensive Guide to CGT available at http://www.sars.gov.za (accessed  6 November 
2013).   
199 In terms of paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to the ITA, a capital gain is attributed to a 
beneficiary in certain circumstances. Part X of the Eighth Schedule provides for the attribution of 
gains to a donor in certain circumstances.  
200 Section 25B together with paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule ensures that the conduit principle 
applies in respect of capital gains.  
201 Paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA. In terms of s 1 of the ITA  a ‘çonnected person’ in 
relation to a trust includes the following: i) any beneficiary of a trust, ii) any relative of such 
beneficiary, iii) any other trust of which a beneficiary or relative is a beneficiary.  
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trust and some other connected person. This rule ensures that transactions between 
connected persons are always at arm’s length and at market values.202 Another anti-
tax-avoidance rule that will apply in the case of trusts is the so-called ‘clogged- loss’ 
rule,
203
 which ensures that any capital loss incurred as a result of a transaction 
between connected persons, cannot be taken into account in determining a person’s 
aggregate gain or aggregate capital loss for a tax year.  
The provisions of paragraphs 80(1) and 80(2) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA 
resemble the provisions of s 25B of the ITA. Thus, where a capital gain arises as a 
result of the vesting of a trust asset in a resident beneficiary, the gain must be ignored 
when calculating the trust’s aggregate gain or loss and must be taken into account in 
calculating the beneficiary’s aggregate gain or loss for that tax year.204 Where the trust 
disposes of the trust asset (other than to the beneficiary) and the capital gain, or a 
portion thereof is vested in a resident beneficiary by virtue of the trustees exercising 
their discretion, the gain is to be ignored when calculating the trust’s aggregate gain 
or loss and must be taken into account in calculating the beneficiaries aggregate gain 
or loss for that year.
205
  
As in the case of s 25B of the ITA, the provisions of paragraph 80 of the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA are also subject to anti-tax-avoidance rules, in this case, the 
attribution rules which are contained in paragraphs 68 to 72 of the Eighth Schedule of 
the ITA.  
                                                            
202 Geach (2007) 253.  
203 Paragraph 38 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
204 Paragraph 80(1) of the Eight Schedule of the ITA.  
205 Paragraph 80(2) of the Eight Schedule of the ITA.  
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When the core rules and provisions of paragraphs 80(1), 80(2) together with 
paragraphs 68 to 72 are looked at in totality, the scheme of the ITA creates a clear 
sequence in which gains are to be taxed. Capital gains will be taxed: 
 First, in the hands of a beneficiary where paragraphs 80(1) and 80(2) 
apply;  
 Secondly, where the attribution rules apply, they override paragraphs 
80(1) and 80(2), and the gains or a portion thereof, will be taxed in the 
hands of the donor; 
 Lastly, if none of the above applies, the gain will be taxed in the 
trust.
206
 
 
6.2Attribution rules  
The Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains anti-avoidance provisions which largely 
mirror the provisions of s 7 and s 25B(2A) of the ITA. The provisions in the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA mirroring those in s 7, all have the effect of deeming a capital 
gain made by a trust to be that of a person (hereafter donor) who has made a 
‘donation, settlement or other disposition’ (hereafter donation) to the trust, if the 
capital gain is attributable to the donation. Paragraphs 70 and 71 particularly apply to 
discretionary family trusts. However, for the sake of completeness the other 
paragraphs will also be referred to.  
                                                            
206 The core rules in Part II of the Eight Schedule.  
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The anti-tax-avoidance provisions in the Eighth Schedule of the ITA relating to trusts 
are in summary, as follows: 
 
6.2.1 Attribution of capital gain to a spouse: paragraph 68 
If, by reason of a donation made by spouse A or a transaction, operation or scheme 
entered into by spouse A, a capital gain accrues to spouse B, the capital gain will be 
deemed to be the capital gain of spouse A,  if the purpose of spouse A was to reduce, 
postpone or avoid any tax administered by the Commissioner. The spouse whose 
capital gain it is deemed to be, is required to disclose the capital gain in his or her tax 
return.
207
 Paragraph 68(1) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA mirrors s 7(2)(a) of the 
ITA.  
 
6.2.2 Attribution of capital gain to a parent of a minor child:  paragraph 69 
Where a donation to a trust is made by a parent of a minor child or by another person 
in return for a donation by the parent in favour directly or indirectly of that other 
person or his family, a capital gain which is attributable to the donation is deemed to 
be that of the parent. The parent whose capital gain it is deemed to be, is required to 
disclose the capital gain in his or her tax return.
208
 Paragraph 69 of the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA mirrors sections 7(3) and 7(4) of the ITA.   
 
6.2.3 Attribution of capital gain subject to conditional vesting: paragraph 70   
                                                            
207 Section 68(1)(b) of the ITA.  
208 Section 68(3) of the ITA.  
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Where a donation is made to a discretionary family trust which contains a stipulation 
or condition imposed by the donor or anyone else in terms of which a capital gain 
attributable to the donation is not to vest in the beneficiaries of the trust or some of 
them until the happening of some fixed or contingent event, and the gain has not 
vested during the relevant year of assessment in any resident beneficiary, the gain is 
deemed to be that of the donor. 
A key part of this paragraph is that the capital gain will not vest in any beneficiary 
until the happening of some event whether ‘fixed or contingent’.209 This sort of event 
may be the death of a person, the attainment of a certain age, the marriage of someone 
or even, the exercise by trustees of their discretion.   
Paragraph 70 will only apply to situations where a capital gain is accumulated in a 
trust and not paid out or distributed to a beneficiary. Paragraph 70 of the Eighth 
Schedule mirrors s 7(5) of the ITA.  
  
6.2.4 Attribution of capital gain subject to revocable vesting: paragraph 71  
Paragraph 71 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains an anti-avoidance provision 
similar to s 7(6) of the ITA. It is aimed at the situation where a trust deed confers a 
right to receive a capital gain on a resident beneficiary but that the person conferring 
the right has the power to revoke it or confer it upon another person. In such 
circumstances if such person has made a donation to such trust then if in a particular 
year a capital gain attributable to such donation vests in the aforesaid beneficiary, the 
capital gain will be deemed to be that person’s gain and not that of the beneficiary. 
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For paragraph 71 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA to operate it is essential that 
throughout the year in which the relevant capital gain vests in the beneficiary the 
donor retained the power to revoke or vary and was a resident. 
 
6.2.5 Attribution of capital gain vesting in a non-resident: paragraph 72  
Paragraph 72 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains an anti-avoidance provision 
similar to s 7(8) of the ITA. It covers the situation where a resident has made a 
donation to a non-resident (including a non-resident trust) and by reason thereof a 
capital gain
210
 accrues to the non-resident. Paragraph 72 deems the gain to be the 
donor’s gain.  
 
6.2.6 Paragraph 80(3) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA  
Paragraph 80(3) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains an anti-avoidance 
provision similar to s 25B(2A) of the ITA. It deals with two situations: 
 
 A capital gain arises in a non-resident trust in a particular year but is not 
subjected to tax in SA in that year. In a subsequent year that capital gain vests 
in a resident. It is treated as a capital gain in the hands of that resident in that 
year, if in the year that it arose in the trust the resident had a contingent right 
to it.
211
 
                                                            
210 Including any amount that would have constituted a capital gain had that person been a resident 
(paragraph 72(b)). This inclusion is to counter the argument that it is only South African source gains 
that can arise in the hands of a non-resident and which can be attributed from that non-resident to a 
resident in terms of paragraph 72. Such an interpretation would limit the scope of this provision.  
211 Paragraph 80(3)(a)(i) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
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 An amount accrues to a non- resident trust in a particular year, which would 
have constituted a capital gain if the trust had been a resident, and it vests in a 
resident in that year or any subsequent year and it has not been subject to tax 
in SA. The capital gain is treated as a capital gain in the hands of the resident 
in the year that it vests in the resident.
212
 
Since the attribution rules contained in the Eighth Schedule of the ITA mirror the 
deeming provisions in s 7 of the ITA, the considerations in respect of their application 
are largely the same. The amount of the gain attributed to the donor is limited by the 
application of paragraph 73 of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA to the amount which 
was left to be taxed in the hands of the person who received the donation. The ability 
to establish the limit to which income and capital gains may be attributed to a donor 
opens the door to interesting tax and estate planning considerations.
213
 From an 
income tax perspective, where the donor is able to satisfy the onus placed on him in 
terms of s 27 of the TLAA, it can lead to tax savings on his part. The income which is 
correctly attributable to the donation will be taxable in his hands. The balance will be 
taxed where it accrued. 
Sight must not be lost of the fact that sections 80A to 80L of the ITA (the general 
anti-avoidance provisions of the ITA) may be applicable where CGT has been 
avoided, reduced or postponed through the use of trusts.  
 
7. ESTATE DUTY   
A trust is only regarded as a person for estate duty purposes when statutory provision 
                                                            
212 Paragraph 80(3)(a)(ii) of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA.  
213 Carroll E (2010) 50.  
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is made for it.
214
 The fact that a trust is not a separate person, but that the assets also 
do not form part of the estate of the founder, opens the door for the use of a trust as a 
vehicle for estate duty avoidance.  
The EDA makes provision that estate duty is payable in respect of the estate of every 
person who dies and who was ordinarily resident in South Africa at the date of his or 
her death.
215
 Section 4A of the EDA provides that the dutiable amount of the estate of 
any person shall be determined by deducting from the net value of that estate an 
amount of R3.5 million.  This means that if an estate owner’s estate values less than 
R3.5 million, no estate duty is payable.  
The estate of any person consists of all property in terms of s 3(2) of the EDA of that 
person at the date of his death and of all property which in accordance with s 3(3) of 
the EDA is deemed to be his property at that date. ‘Property’ is defined in s 3(2) of 
the EDA, as any right in or to property, movable or immovable, corporeal or 
incorporeal, and includes any fiduciary, usufructuary or other like interest in property 
(including a right to an annuity charged upon property) held by the deceased 
immediately prior to his death; and any right to an annuity (other than a right to an 
annuity charged upon any property) enjoyed by the deceased immediately prior to his 
death which accrued to some other person on the death of the deceased.   
Where under a discretionary family trust the trustee has discretion to withhold the 
trust income and/or trust capital from a trust beneficiary, then the trust beneficiary has 
no property in terms of s 3(2) of the EDA. This means that the trust beneficiary has 
                                                            
214CIR v MacNeillie’s Estate 1961 (3) SA 833 (A) 841.   
215 Section 2 of the EDA provides that estate duty shall be charged, levied and collected in respect of 
the estate of every person who dies on or after 1 April 1955. Section 3 contains the definition of 
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not obtained a vested right to such benefit before that discretion is exercised by the 
trustee. No estate duty will be payable should a trust beneficiary under a discretionary 
testamentary ownership trust die without ever having received trust income and/or 
trust capital.
216
  
It is clear that a trust can be a useful vehicle in estate planning, because it can be used 
to ensure that property is not that of the deceased at the time of the deceased’s death. 
To be effective however, it must also be ensured that none of the assets of a trust can 
be regarded as deemed property of the deceased at the time of death.
217
 
Section 3(3)(d) of the EDA is an anti-avoidance provision which deems property of 
which the deceased was competent to dispose of immediately prior to his death for his 
own benefit or for the benefit of his estate, to be part of the dutiable property of the 
deceased for estate duty purposes.
218
 The wording of s 3(3)(d) of the EDA is as 
follows: 
     ‘(3) Property which is deemed to be the property of the deceased includes- 
(d)‘property (being property not otherwise chargeable under this Act or 
the full value of which is not otherwise required to be taken into account 
in the determination of the dutiable amount of the estate) of which the 
deceased was immediately prior to his death competent to dispose of for 
his own benefit or for the benefit of the estate.’ 
The exact ambit of this section cannot be defined with certainty, but it would seem to 
apply if the deceased had the power to revoke or vary the provisions of any donation, 
                                                            
216Du Toit F South African Trust Law (2007) 171. 
217 Geach (2007) 281.  
218 Honiball & Olivier (2009) 195.  
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settlement or trust, or other disposition made by the deceased, for his own or his  
estate’s benefit.219 
‘Competent to dispose of include’:220   
 The power to revoke or vary the provisions of any trust (s 3(5)(b)); 
 The power that enables the estate owner to cause a trust to dispose of such 
property as the estate owner sees fit (s 3(4)(b), no matter how such power is 
conferred (even by way of having power of appointment and replacement of 
trustees); and 
 The power of an estate owner to compel the trustees to agree to variations. 
If an estate owner has a power to appoint and replace trustees, such trustees are likely 
to agree to wishes of the estate owner. However, in law they are not obliged to do so, 
and therefore the retention of the power by an estate owner is unlikely to bring trust 
assets in as deemed property. If the deceased retained the powers listed above over 
assets in a discretionary family trust (which the deceased had formed in order to 
freeze his or her estate), the whole estate planning exercise could be rendered 
unsuccessful. To be effective and to avoid this deeming provision, trust deeds should 
not permit the estate owner to make decisions on property dispositions, whether 
acting alone or with notice to the trustees. Trust deeds should provide that any 
disposals of property could only take place by decision of all trustees acting together 
while exercising their own independent judgement.  
                                                            
219 Geach (2007) 281.  
220 Geach (2007) 281.  
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The effect of s 3(3)(d) of the EDA is that if the trust assets are treated as the personal 
assets of the estate owner, then the trust property will be regarded as the property of 
the estate owner. Estate duty may then be payable in the event of the estate owner’s 
estate and that of the trust totals in excess of R3.5 million. In the Badenhorst case the 
court held that in order to succeed in a claim that trust assets be included in the estate 
of one of the parties to a marriage there needs to be evidence that such party 
controlled the trust and but for the trust, would have acquired and owned the assets in 
his own name.
221
 Generally, estate owners envisage limiting their personal estates to 
below R3.5 million in order to avoid their estate having to pay estate duty or to limit 
the amount which is payable. 
 
8.SUMMARY  
The discretionary family trust could be held liable for tax if it is found that the trust 
entered into impermissible avoidance arrangements in terms of the general anti-
avoidance provisions of the ITA.  
The ITA seeks to prevent income splitting. The income accruing to the trust is drawn 
into the hands of the beneficiary with a vested right in terms of s 25B of the ITA. The 
income will be taxed there unless one of the deeming provisions of s7 of the ITA 
applies. If one of the provisions of s7 applies the ITA will draw the income into the 
hands of the donor to be taxed there.
222
 
The impact that s 25B has on the discretionary family trust is that the beneficiary will 
only be liable for income tax when the trustees decided to vest the trust income in 
                                                            
221 Badenhorst case 367.  
222 Carroll E ‘ SARS’ ability to attribute trust income and capital gains to a donor-parent’ (LLM Thesis, 
North West University (2010) 9 (hereafter Carroll E (2010)).  
 85 
him. If the income is not vested in the beneficiary then the trust will be taxed. The 
income will also not form part of the beneficiary’s deceased estate because the 
income has not vested in him.  
The interpretation of the term POEM can prevent trustees from manipulating the 
residence of the discretionary trust in order to avoid tax.  
The Eighth Schedule of the ITA contains anti-tax-avoidance provisions which largely 
mirror the provisions of s 7 and s 25B(2A) of the ITA. The provisions in the Eighth 
Schedule of the ITA mirroring those in s 7, all have the effect of deeming a capital 
gain made by a trust to be that of a person who has made a donation to the trust, if the 
capital gain is attributable to the donation. Paragraph 70 and 71 particularly apply to 
discretionary family trusts. 
Where under a discretionary family trust the trustee has discretion to withhold the 
trust income and/or trust capital from a trust beneficiary, then the trust beneficiary has 
no property in terms of s 3(2) of the EDA. This means that the trust beneficiary has 
not obtained a vested right to such benefit before that discretion is exercised by the 
trustee. 
From an estate planning point of view, it is advisable to create a discretionary inter 
vivos family trust, since estate duty liability will not accrue to the trust beneficiary 
before vesting has taken place. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION   
 
1.IMPACT OF THE STATUTORY ANTI- AVOIDANCE MEASURES ON 
THE DISCRETIONARY FAMILY TRUST  
Discretionary trusts are those under which the trustees have the discretion to distribute 
trust income and/or trust capital to the beneficiaries. It is primarily discretionary 
trusts, whether inter vivos or testamentary in nature, which are used in estate planning 
in SA. A discretionary inter vivos family trust is a popular vehicle for estate planning 
purposes because the trust assets are regarded as separate from those of the founder as 
well as from those of an individual trust beneficiary. 
One reason for this is that a vested right to trust capital and/or trust income clearly 
falls within the definition of property for estate duty purposes. On the other hand, a 
contingent right to trust capital and/or trust income or a spes, falls outside a dutiable 
estate. In the Badenhorst case which dealt with an inter vivos discretionary family 
trust, the court indicated pertinently that the trust was created to protect the family 
against creditors and to avoid estate duty.  
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In practice, the discretionary trust is often the alter ego of the founder and/or trustee-
beneficiary of the trust. The assets under the trust may, in law, be regarded as those of 
the founder and/or trustee-beneficiary and dealt with accordingly. In order to avoid 
trust assets being regarded as the assets of someone rather than those of the trust, it is 
advisable to ensure that there is indeed a making over of trust assets to trustees, and 
that the trustees actually do manage and control assets on behalf of the trust 
beneficiaries in accordance with the terms and conditions of the trust deed. Due to the 
abuse of the trust form by founders and /or trustee-beneficiaries, trusts are 
increasingly coming under scrutiny by the courts.  
For estate planning purposes, should estate owners and/or trustees of discretionary 
family trusts be cognisant of the fact that if the court determines that the reason why a 
transaction was entered into was for the purpose to avoid liability for tax, the court 
may regard the transaction as simulated. Tax liability may then possibly follow. The 
principle of the NWK case can, for example, be applied in a situation where an estate 
owner or donor sells shares to a discretionary family trust at their market value but the selling 
price is left outstanding on loan account.. The estate owner and/or donor may also be held 
liable in terms of the general anti-avoidance provisions, which are contained in s 80A 
to s 80L of the ITA. 
There are practical implications when it is discovered that a trust is a sham, on the one 
hand, and when the trust form has been abused, on the other hand. When a trust is a 
sham, the ‘founder’ will remain owner of the ‘trust assets’. Consequently, neither the 
‘trustees’ nor the ‘beneficiaries’ will acquire any rights with regard to these ‘trust 
assets’. Matters are different in the abuse situation since both the trustees and 
beneficiaries will acquire rights with regard to the trust assets. This opens the door for 
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the possibility that the court may go behind the trust form and order the application of 
the trust assets for a particular purpose. 
A consequence of treating the trust property as the personal property of the founder 
and/or trustee-beneficiary is that his estate may be larger than planned. The estate 
owner’s estate and/or trustee-beneficiary may then possibly be liable for estate duty 
upon his death. 
The ‘piercing of the veneer of the trust’ issue is particularly crucial for discretionary 
family trusts since generally, the trustees of the family trust are also the beneficiaries 
of the trust and/ or the founder of the trust is also a trustee of the trust. It is important 
that the legal separation in the ownership (control) of the trust property and the 
enjoyment derived from the trust property be maintained. It is also important that the 
trustees act in terms of the provisions of the trust instrument.  
The impact that s 25B of the ITA has on the discretionary family trust is that the 
beneficiary will only be liable for income tax when the trustees decide to vest the trust 
income in him. If the income is not vested in the beneficiary then the trust will be 
taxed. The income will also not form part of the beneficiary’s deceased estate because 
the income has not vested in him. The fact that the income will not form part of the 
beneficiary’s deceased estate is an advantage since the value of his deceased estate 
will not be increased and the possibility to be liable for estate duty is reduced. The 
discretionary family trust is however taxed at a high tax rate and this will have the 
effect of reducing the value of the trust income. 
One of the reasons why discretionary family trusts are popular for estate planning 
purposes is the effect of the statutory anti-tax avoidance provisions, which are 
contained in s 7 of the ITA. These tax-back or attribution provisions, to the extent that 
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they are applicable to donations and other similar dispositions to a trust, have the 
effect that the estate owner or a donor to a trust, as opposed to a trust itself, will pay 
any income tax arising from income earned by the trust by reason of or in 
consequence of any donation to the trust. The result is that the trust’s income and 
assets are preserved and are effectively increased to the extent that the estate owner or 
donor pays the tax and does not reclaim such tax from the trust. Similar 
considerations apply with regards to capital gains. Consequently, in circumstances 
where the estate owner or donor wishes to reduce his estate for estate planning 
purposes and increase the estate of the trust, he should ensure that the tax-back or 
attribution provisions of s 7 of the ITA and or the tax- back or attribution provisions 
of the Eighth Schedule of the ITA do indeed apply (as opposed to avoid their 
application). 
In the Badenhorst case the court took into consideration the fact that the founder and 
trustee had the discretion whether to distribute the trust income or trust capital to the 
beneficiaries in order to determine whether the founder and trustee was in de facto 
control of the trust estate. This discretion of the founder is also entrenched in s 7(6) of 
the ITA. When it is discovered that the founder was in de facto control of the trust, 
liability for tax may arise. 
The impact of s 3(3)(d) of the EDA on the discretionary family trust is that if the trust 
assets are treated as the personal assets of the estate owner, then the trust property 
may be regarded as the property of the estate owner. Estate duty may then be payable 
in the event of the estate owner’s estate and that of the trust totals in excess of R3.5 
million. The purpose of creating a discretionary family trust as an estate planning 
vehicle would thus be defeated because the trust property would under these 
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circumstances be regarded as the personal property of the estate owner and not as 
those of the trust. It is thus important for estate planning purposes that the trust assets 
should be treated separately from the personal property of the estate owner as well as 
from those of the trustees. It is particularly important in discretionary family trusts 
where the trustees and beneficiaries are the same persons. 
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